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ABSTRACT
The Impact of Institutional Ownership on Firm Performance
in the Hospitality Industry
by
Ming-chih Tsai
Dr. Zheng Gu, Examination Committee Chair
Professor o f Hotel Administration
University o f Nevada, Las Vegas
Institutional investors have become important players in today’s financial markets
and their increasing importance in corporate governance in the United States (U.S.) is
further evidenced by the growing volume o f corporate equity they control. The ownership
structure/firm performance relationship has always been a subject o f debate. Similarly, in
the hospitality industry as o f June 2002, institutional investors were estimated to own
$2.3 hillion, or 66.7% o f total outstanding shares in PricewaterhouseCoopers’ lodging
universe.
This dissertation examines the impact o f institutional ownership on firm performance
as measured by a proxy for Tobin’s Q in the restaurant, casino and hotel sectors from
1999-2003. Given the endogeneity o f institutional ownership in the restaurant and casino
sectors, firm performance in these areas is significantly dependent upon the percentage o f
institutional ownership, and vice versa. In the hotel sector, however, there is no
significant systematic relationship between institutional ownership and firm performance,
when all other firm-specific variables controlled.
iii
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This dissertation contributes to the body o f the hospitality finance literature,
particularly in the area o f corporate governance, by identifying significant relationships
between institutional ownership and firm performance in the restaurant and casino sectors.
In addition, this study reveals that investing institutionally in the restaurant and casino
sectors may help hospitality industry investors mitigate the agency problem caused by the
separation o f management from ownership. This, in turn, will enhance the value o f the
firms in the capital market.
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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION
Institutional investors have become important players in today’s financial markets.
Their increasing importance in corporate governance in the United States (U.S.) is further
observed from the growing volume o f corporate equity they control. As o f 2003,
institutional investors were estimated to control 60% o f all outstanding equity in the U.S.
(Hayashi, 2003), compared to 45% in 1990, 33% in 1980 and 8% in 1950 (Taylor, 1990).
Accompanying the growing volume o f institutional shareholdings in the equity market,
the role o f institutional investors has changed dramatically from that o f simply passive
investors to active monitors. Traditionally, institutional investors are not directly involved
in corporate management decisions; instead, they simply follow the “Wall Street Rule” or
an “exit policy” by selling their stakes when dissatisfied with the management or stock
performance (Bathala, Moon, & Rao, 1994; Graves & Waddock, 1990). Further, they
“window dress” their portfolios and exercise their power in terms o f buying winners and
selling losers in the market place to change the m arket’s perception o f the risk or success
o f the institution’s trading strategy (Lang & McNichols, 1997). Because o f their
fragmented and transient ownership characteristics, institutions may trade off control for
liquidity and thus act as passive investors (Bhide, 1993; Coffee, 1991; Rajgopal &
Venkatachalam, 1997).
1
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With increasingly significant ownership o f equity in a firm, it has become less costly
and yet more powerful for institutions to “voice” disagreement with the management
instead o f following an “exit policy” by liquidating significant holdings at substantial
discounts and, therefore, depressing the firm’s stock price (Coffee, 1991; Pound, 1992).
Institutional investors, as opposed to non-institutional investors, are more likely to vote
and engage in corporate management decisions due to their significant ownership o f
equity in the firms (Brickley, Lease & Smith, 1998) and attempt to influence top firm
management to manage for the long-term interests o f shareholders (Holdemess &
Sheehan, 1988; Hoskisson, Johnson & Moesel, 1994). In other words, institutional
investors may have recently assumed a more effective monitoring role with collective
capacity in the corporate governance arena. As a result, they may further influence
corporate management decisions and possibly, firm performance (Black, 1992; Chaganti
& Damanpour, 1991; Pound, 1991).
The observed increase in institutional ownership in the equity market has been
attributed to the growth in pension funds (both public and private) and the passage o f the
Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) in 1974 (Graves & Waddock, 1990;
Sherman, Beldona & Joshi, 1998). Public pension funds, such as the California Public
Employees’ Retirement System (CalPERS), are primarily defined benefit funds that
provide retirement and health benefits to public employees (CalPERS, 2005). Public
pension funds are governed by state regulations, and allowable investments made by fund
administrators are prescribed by state legislation. State officials managing public pension
funds are normally elected, and their compensation structures are generally not tied to
fund performance. If a public pension fund does not perform well enough to cover the
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fixed benefit payment to its beneficiaries under the defined benefit plan, the deficit comes
from taxpayers. In addition, politically aspired public pension fund administrators may
have a divergent orientation that is not in line with the best interests o f either the fund
beneficiaries or other shareholders in the firm (Romano, 1993; Woidtke, 2002). On the
other hand, private pension funds include both defined contribution funds and defined
benefit funds, and are governed by ERISA. In December 1985, the Financial Accounting
Standards Board (FASB) issued Statement o f Financial Accounting Standards No. 87
governing employers’ accounting for pensions (FASB, 2004). ERISA and FASB No. 87
require annual re-evaluation of pension funds by comparing each fund’s current assets
and the present value o f future pension obligations as specified in the defined benefit plan.
The employer’s contribution to the plan is reduced when the fund’s current assets
increase (Drucker, 1986; Graves, 1988; Graves & Waddock, 1990), and this is likely to
put short-term financial performance pressure on institutions (Chaganti & Damanpour,
1991). Performance-based compensation structures for private pension fund
administrators are also likely to offer incentives for fund administrators to pursue
short-term gains instead o f value maximization over a long-term horizon.
The short-term vision o f private pension fund administrators is shared by mutual fund
and investment bank managers who emphasize a high current return because o f their own
reward systems (Johnson & Greening, 1999). Empirical studies show that mutual fund
managers tend to hold a firm’s stock for less time than pension fund administrators
(Gilson & Kraakman, 1991) and they may adjust the riskiness o f their investment
portfolio in an attempt to maximize their expected compensation, instead o f shareholders’
wealth or firm value (Brown, Harlow & Starks, 1996). Mutual fund and investment bank

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

managers are often evaluated on a quarterly basis and a bonus/penalty is determined
based on fund performance relative to an index calculated quarterly (Starks, 1987). Given
the pressure for short-term profitability coupled with the potential difficulty o f disposing
large blocks o f shares without incurring a significant loss, mutual fund and investment
bank managers are likely to vie for strategies and projects with a higher probability of
short-term payoff and push firm management towards this orientation (Johnson &
Greening, 1999). In addition, investors in mutual funds are entitled to liquidity and may
retrieve their capital at the prevailing market price at any time (Sherman, Beldona &
Joshi, 1998). This reinforces the short-term orientation o f mutual fund managers.
Different types o f institutional investors reveal different investment behaviors and
pursue diverse objectives, subject to federal and state regulations, various clienteles, and
other conditions and constraints. One thing they have in common, however, is that
institutional investors have a fiduciary duty to their clients or beneficiaries, which
requires them to act with loyalty and administer funds in a prudent manner (Association
for Investment Management and Research “AIM R”, 1999). In other words, institutional
investors, whether they have a short-term or long-term orientation, must represent their
clients or beneficiaries and maximize their interests in the firms they invest. Thus, these
large firm shareholders can become effective monitors and may increase firm value
accordingly (Agrawal & Knoeber, 1996; Black, 1992; Pound, 1991). Relationship
investing, dictating that investing with the goal o f influencing the management o f the
firm in which the investment is made (AIMR, 1999), can be key to a successful strategy
for plan/firm value enhancement. Under ERISA, relationship investing is allowed by
institutional investors if an investment strategy is consistent with the fiduciary duty to
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enhance the value o f the plan’s investment in the firm, and hence, the enhancement o f a
firm’s value (AIMR, 1999).
While investing in a firm, institutional investors essentially represent a group o f
individual investors with the collective capacity and power to “voice” disagreement with
firm management and to vote on corporate management decisions. Here, an agency
relationship is said to exist where firm managers act as the agent o f institutional
investors— the principal. Theoretically, in a principal— agent context, agents (managers)
should act in the principals’ (shareholders) best interests. In other words, firm managers
have a fiduciary duty to maximize shareholder wealth and firm value. However, problems
exist due to the separation o f ownership and control in corporations (Berle & Means,
1932; Jensen & Meckling, 1976). Agency problems arise within a firm when firm
managers pursue their own interests at the shareholders’ expense or when the interests o f
the two parties are not aligned. Agency costs, stemming from these problems, incur while
the principal pays to keep their agents from committing aberrant activities (Jensen &
Meckling, 1976). Several mechanisms may mitigate agency problems, and one such
instrument is concentrated shareholdings by institutions (Cmtchley, Jensen, Jahera &
Raymond, 1999). Institutional investors assume responsibility for managerial monitoring
from a corporate governance perspective derived from their own fiduciary duty to clients
or beneficiaries. They are believed to help improve firm performance accordingly
(Agrawal & Knoeber, 1996; Black, 1992; Pound, 1991).
Since Berle & Means (1932) first commented on problems caused by the separation
o f ownership and control in corporations, the impact o f ownership structure on firm
performance has been a subject o f debate. While a body o f literature has been dedicated
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to examining the relationship between the two, no consensus has heen reached hy
previous researchers as to whether ownership structure (e.g., shareholdings by institutions,
corporate management, blockholders, etc.) influences firm performance. Also, the extent
and directions to which such influence, if any, is observed remain unclear (Agrawal &
Knoeber, 1996; Chaganti & Damanpour, 1991; Clay, 2001; Craswell, Taylor, & Saywell,
1997; Han & Suk, 1998; Loderer & Martin, 1997; McConnell & Servaes, 1990; Woidtke,
2002). The ongoing debate is not dying down anytime soon as institutions have been
playing a more important role and dominating the capital market in the U.S.

Institutional Ownership in the Hospitality Industry
Publicly-traded firms in the hospitality industry, consisting mainly o f restaurant,
casino and hotel firms, have also become investment targets for institutional investors
since the early 1990s. During the economic recession o f 1990-1991, the hotel industry
suffered from low occupancy rates with overbuilt room inventory in the late 1980s (Hotel
& Motel Management, 1994). In late 1992, the hotel industry started to recuperate and it
became profitable in 1993 (Block, 1998). Along with improved profitability and
performance in the hotel industry, renovations on guest rooms, restaurants, meeting
rooms, lobbies and other public spaces were initiated with available cash flow and, more
importantly, with funding from the increased institutional investment in the hotel industry
(Hotel & Motel Management, 1994). Observing the recovery and foreseeing the
prosperous outlook o f the hotel industry after the recession, institutional investors started
to inject capital into the industry in an attempt not only to help enhance hotel profitability,
but also to boost their own fund performance. Institutional investors’ confidence in and
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support to the hotel industry in terms o f equity capital may have contributed to the
improvement o f the average occupancy rate from 61% to 66%, and the increase o f the
average daily rate from $59 to $79 during 1991-1998 (Gu & Gao, 2000).
As aforementioned, different types o f institutions reveal different investment
behaviors and pursue diverse objectives subject to various conditions and constraints. In
the context o f financing the development and growth o f the lodging industry, the same
theorem applies. Using the Delphi technique, Singh & Schmidgall (2000) surveyed 39
industry experts in 1998 and asked them to predict the probability (i.e., high, moderate,
low probability, or not probable) o f capital provided from various types o f institutions to
ten lodging segments— luxury, upscale, midscale, economy, budget, extended-stay,
convention, casino, resort, and motel— in 2000 and 2005, respectively. Possibly due to
their expected favorable performance outlook, luxury, upscale and convention hotels
were predicted to be more likely financed by pension funds, life insurance companies,
and investment banks. On the other hand, casino hotels were not considered a promising
investment target for institutions in the 39 panelists’ opinion. Casino hotels are expensive
to build and the casino gaming market was considered saturated at that time, as evidenced
by the Las Vegas Strip’s less favorable profitability outlook (Singh & Schmidgall, 2000).
That is, from the perspective o f the 39 panelists in the study, institutional investors were
in favor o f the hotel segments that could bring better financial returns on the capital
investment. This finding is consistent with the notion that institutional investors must
administer their funds in a prudent manner to fulfill their fiduciary duty to their clients or
beneficiaries.
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As o f June 2002, institutional investors were estimated to own $2.3 billion, or 66.7%
o f total outstanding shares in PricewaterhouseCoopers’ lodging universe, which included
40 equities (Hotel & Motel Management, 2002). Out o f the 40 equities, 26 were C
corporations and the remaining 14 were hotel real estate investment trusts (hotel REITs).
The dominance o f institutional investors observed in the lodging industry seems parallel
to that o f the U.S. equity market as a whole. Previous research examined the relationship
between institutional ownership and firm performance in the manufacturing sector; this
study will examine that relationship in the hospitality industry.

Research Questions
The financial goal o f a firm is to maximize its value or shareholder wealth (Keown,
Martin, Petty & Scott, 2003). Given their fiduciary duty, institutional investors may pick
hospitality firms as part o f their investment portfolio and act as large shareholders in an
attempt to enhance their fund performance and their clients’ or beneficiaries’ wealth. In
other words, hospitality firm performance, which reflects fund performance to some
extent, may be o f critical concern to institutional investors and their clients or
beneficiaries.
Given the significant institutional ownership in the lodging industry (Hotel & Motel
Management, 2002), and possibly in other sectors o f the hospitality industry, the first
question is whether some o f the empirical evidence on the relationship between
institutional ownership and firm performance observed in other industries exists in
hospitality as well. That is, will the percentage levels o f institutional shareholdings o f
total outstanding shares in hospitality firms affect their performance? Or, will
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institutional investors help enhance firm performance through their presence and
concentrated shareholdings in the firms? The hospitality industry possesses different
characteristics and features different business and financial risks than other industries;
and this may have influenced institutional investors’ behaviors and decisions in corporate
governance. Furthermore, market capitalization o f hospitality firms is generally much
lower than that o f manufacturing firms. Institutions may be able to exert their collective
power more freely in hospitality firms. Therefore, a significant relationship between
institutional ownership and hospitality firm performance may be reasonably expected.
After looking at the restaurant, casino and hotel sectors in detail, will any significant
relationship exist between institutional ownership and firm performance in each? When
institutional investors make decisions about holding hospitality firm stocks,
characteristics such as capital structure, profitability, riskiness or dividend policy specific
to the three sectors may play an important role. This may lead to different institutional
ownership/firm performance relationship patterns in the three sectors. As far as capital
structure is concerned, the restaurant industry is generally characterized by light
debt-usage, or low financial leverage, as evidenced by an average total debt to equity
ratio o f 0.52 for restaurants for the quarter ending December 31, 2004, compared to 2.09
for the casino industry and 1.18 for the hotel industry, respectively (Reuters, 2005). The
relatively lower debt-usage o f the restaurant industry may attract institutional investors
who prefer industries with low debt burden to reduce the risk associated with insolvency.
On the other hand, the higher debt to equity ratio in the casino and hotel industries may
lure institutions who tend to vote on riskier projects with higher return potential. For, if
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these projects are successful, they can pay o ff the deht holder at the contracted rate and
capture a residual gain.

Justifications
Since Berle and Means (1932) first commented on problems caused by the separation
o f corporate ownership and control, a body o f literature has been dedicated to examining
the relationship between ownership structure (e.g., shareholdings by institutions,
managers, or blockholders) and firm performance mainly in the manufacturing industries.
Yet few scholars have studied how ownership structure may have influenced firm
performance in the hospitality industry. To m y best knowledge, only the impact o f
managerial ownership on firm performance has been examined for the restaurant industry
(Gu & Kim, 2001) and for the hotel industry (Gu & Qian, 1999). However, no other
studies have been documented on the relationship between institutional ownership and
firm performance for any sectors o f the hospitality industry, despite the tremendous
growth o f institutional ownership in the equity market in recent years and the significant
institutional ownership in the lodging industry (Hotel & Motel Management, 2002). This
study attempts to investigate the impact o f institutional ownership on firm performance in
three sectors (i.e., restaurant, casino and hotel) o f the hospitality industry by testing the
relationship between the two while controlling for the effect o f other firm specific
variables.
Investors in the hospitality industry, like hospitality customers and operators, are
important stakeholders. Firm performance, in terms o f stock prices and other relevant
measures (e.g., Tobin’s Q), is o f critical importance to the investors’ vested interest in
10
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hospitality firms and therefore affects their desire to invest in the industry. From a
hospitality firm management perspective, recognizing possible influence from
institutional investors on firm performance may help direct the firm towards value
maximization that is in the shareholders’ best interests.
The findings o f this study could contribute to the body o f hospitality finance
knowledge, particularly in the area o f corporate governance, by providing empirical
evidence from several important service sectors. The study identifies a significant
relationship between institutional ownership and firm performance in two o f the three
major sectors o f the hospitality industry. In addition, it reveals that investing
institutionally in the restaurant and casino sectors may help hospitality industry investors
mitigate the agency problem caused by the separation o f management from ownership,
thus enhancing the value o f the firms in the capital market.

Delimitations
This study is limited to hospitality firms identified through their individual North
American Industry Classification System (NAICS) code numbers and those with
available accounting, financial and institutional ownership information between
1999-2003. In particular, not all firms in the investment portfolio o f institutional investors
during 1999-2003 were included in this study because o f securities reporting regulations
set forth by the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). Institutional
investment managers are only required to report their shareholdings on Form 13F to the
SEC if they exercise investment discretion o f $100 million or more, in fair market value,
in Section 13(f) securities (U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, 2004). That is,
11
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shareholdings in hospitality firms hy institutional investment managers whose portfolios
had less than $100 million fair market value were not reported to the SEC by those
institutions during 1999-2003, and were excluded from this study.
Further, this study employs a proxy for Tobin’s g as a measure o f firm performance.
Although Tobin’s Q is the most commonly-used firm performance measure when
modeling the relationship between ownership structure and firm performance in previous
studies (Cho, 1998; Craswell et al., 1997; Demsetz & Villalonga, 2001; Hermalin &
Weisbach, 1991; Himmelberg, Hubbard, & Palia, 1999; Holdemess, Kroszner, Sheehan,
1999; Loderer & Martin, 1997; McConnell & Servaes, 1990; Morck, Shleifer, & Vishny,
1988), possible distortions in Tobin’s Q in measuring intangible assets and replacement
costs o f total assets could present a problem. Although other firm performance measures
such as stock return and accounting return also exist, a proxy for Tobin’s Q, which is also
widely used in previous studies (Clay 2001; Gompers, Ishii & Metrick, 2003; Kaplan &
Zingales, 1997), was used as a measure o f firm performance in this study. This proxy
measure is known as the book value o f total assets plus the market value o f equity minus
the sum o f the book value o f common equity and deferred taxes, all divided by the book
value o f total assets.

Definitions
1. BETA.

This is a symbol representing the systematic risk o f a firm’s stock or the

undiversifiable portion o f the investment risk inherent in stock ownership
2. DEBT.

This is a symbol measuring financial leverage o f a firm. It is calculated as

the ratio o f total debt to total assets.
12
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3. DIV.

This is a symbol representing dividend payout ratio. The ratio is calculated

as dividends divided by income before extraordinary items adjusted for common stock
equivalents (COMPUSTAT, 2003)
4. Endogeneitv.

A term used to describe the presence o f an endogenous explanatory

variable in this study.
5. Endogenous Variables.

In simultaneous equations models, variables that are

determined by the equations in the system or that are determined from within the system.
6. Exogenous Variables.

Variables that are determined outside the model o f interest

and that are uneorrelated with the error term in the model.
7. FIX.

This is a symbol measuring expenditures on fixed plant and equipment, or

capital expenditures, as a fraction o f sales revenues.
8. Institutional Investors.

Entity or organizations with large amounts o f capital to

invest, including pension funds, mutual funds, investment companies, insurance
companies, and endowment funds, and to exercise discretion over the investments o f
others.
9. Instrumental Variables (IVT

In an equation with an endogenous explanatory

variable, an instrumental variable is a variable that is uneorrelated with the error term in
the equation, that does not appear in the equation, and that is partially correlated with the
endogenous explanatory variable (Wooldridge, 2003).
10. North American Industry Classification Svstem (NAICS).

A classification system

that has replaced the U.S. Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) system and was
developed jointly by the U.S., Canada and Mexico.
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11. Ordinary Least Squares (OLSI.

A method o f estimating the parameters o f a

multiple linear regression model by minimizing the sum o f squared residuals
(Wooldridge, 2003).
12. Proxy 0 .

A proxy that approximates Tobin’s Q\ calculated as the book value o f

total assets plus the market value o f common equity minus the sum o f the book value o f
common equity and deferred taxes, all divided by the book value o f total assets.
13. ROA.

This is a symbol measuring firm profitability ratio. This ratio is defined as

net income divided by total assets.
14. Shareholder Activism.

Active monitoring o f the management o f firms rather than

efficient portfolio selection without an active role in monitoring (Rajgopal &
Venkatacbalam, 1997). Also known as relationship investing.
15. Simultaneous Equations Model (SEMI.

A model consisting o f two or more

jointly-determined endogenous variables, where each endogenous variable can be
expressed as a function o f other endogenous variables and o f exogenous variables
(Wooldridge, 2003).
16. SIZE.

This is a symbol measuring firm size. It is calculated as logarithm o f total

assets.
17. Two-stage Least Squares (2SLST

A regression technique that uses instrumental

variables that are uneorrelated with the error terms to compute fitted values o f the
problematic predictor(s) in the first stage, and then uses the fitted values to estimate a
linear regression model o f the dependent variable in the second stage (SPSS 11.0 Help
File).
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18. Tobin’s Q .

A frequently used firm performance measure; defined as the ratio o f

the year-end total market value o f the firm to the estimated replacement costs o f its
assets.

Summary
The phenomenal growth o f institutional ownership in the equity market in the U.S.
was discussed, and major types o f institutional investors were introduced. The need for
an examination o f the relationship between institutional ownership and hospitality firm
performance was justified. The research questions were devised accordingly. Also, the
terms that are used throughout this dissertation were defined. Next, a review o f related
literature follows in Chapter Two.

15
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CHAPTER 2

REVIEW OF RELATED LITERATURE
This chapter reviews related literature on the relationship between institutional
ownership and firm performance. The first section discusses the myopic institutions
theory and is followed by a review o f the role o f institutions as monitoring agents in the
second section. Further in the second section, institutional monitoring is reviewed in the
agency framework, and institutional shareholder activism and the free rider problem are
presented. State restrictions on institutional ownership in casino firms are introduced in
the third section. Previous empirical studies on the relationship between institutional
ownership and firm performance in other industries are reviewed in the fourth section.
This chapter then concludes with a summary section.

The Myopic Institutions Theory
Graves & Waddock (1994) argued that the increase in the level o f institutional
ownership has been associated with a decline in the competitiveness and financial
performance o f U.S. firms. This is partially due to institutional investors’ need to show
improved results on their funds frequently, and they pursue short-term performance
because they are rewarded based on quarterly results (Graves & Waddock, 1994; Hansen
& Hill, 1991 ; Starks, 1987). A survey o f 400 U.S. chief executives in 1987 revealed
16
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institutional investors as one o f the greatest sources o f pressure on corporations to
achieve short-term performance (Nussbaum & Dobrzynski, 1987). As a result, top firm
management is often accused o f not managing the firm for the long-term due to
short-term performance pressure from institutional investors, or being non-responsive to
diverse stakeholders such as communities, employees and the environment that could
possibly help enhance firm performance in the long run (Johnson & Greening, 1999).
The short-term vision o f institutional investors has been associated with the myopic
institutions theory. It posits that institutional fund managers are under pressure from their
superiors for short-term performance and they make their “buy” or “sell” decisions in
response to organizational pressures and factors affecting their job security and
advancement (Graves, 1988; Hansen & Hill, 1991; Hill, Hitt & Hoskisson, 1988;
Loescher, 1984). That is, it is safer for institutional fund managers to simply dispose o f
shares o f poorly-performing firms and buy better-performing ones than to incur
monitoring costs to influence firm decisions and run the risk o f further deterioration o f
fund performance by the declining stocks (Hansen & Hill, 1991). Institutional investors
are viewed as not willing to invest their “time” in poorly-performing firms, and they may
not he willing to vote on projects that have a longer payback period, either. For a sample
o f 22 computer manufacturing firms between 1976 and 1985, Graves (1988) provided
empirical evidence that a negative relationship exists between the level o f institutional
ownership and research & development (R&D) expenditures. Explicitly, institutional
investors were found not to be committed to R&D, which served as a proxy for internal
long-term investment in the study.

17
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Although the myopic institutions theory is supported by theoretical and empirical
foundations as stated above, some researchers (Bushee, 1998; Hansen & Hill, 1991;
Karake, 1996; Rajgopal & Venkatachalam, 1997) offered opposite evidence and
challenged the theory. When studying four technology-driven industries including
pharmaceutical, chemical, computer and aerospace between 1977-1987, Hansen & Hill
(1991) did not find institutional ownership and R&D intensity negatively-related. Rather,
they found a significant and positive relationship between institutional ownership and
R&D intensity, which discredits the myopic institutions theory. R&D intensity in their
study represented R&D expenditures as a percentage o f total sales.
Additional evidence opposing the myopic institutions theory was presented by Karake
(1996) who examined the relationship between institutional ownership and information
technology investment/performance. Using relative information technology index (RITI)
as a proxy for mid to long-term firm investment commitment, Karake (1996) surveyed
305 information technology executives in the U.S. and found a positive relationship
between the level o f institutional ownership and the company’s RITI. In other words,
despite the possibility o f short-term earnings depression and volatility, institutional
investors do value companies with long-term investments in information technology.
Firm managers may become myopic to some extent if the myopic institutions theory
is to hold. Fearing myopic institutions’ selling large blocks o f firm shares that may
depress share price, firm managers may become myopic in artificially inflating current
earnings. Proposing a probit model relating the sign o f discretionary accruals (i.e.,
income increasing or decreasing) to the level o f institutional ownership with 5,707
firm/year observations between 1989-1995, Rajgopal & Venkatachalam (1997) found
18
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neither the percentage o f institutional ownership nor the number o f institutional investors
systematically correlated to the type o f aecrual manipulation. That is, the extent o f
institutional ownership does not motivate firm managers to engage in income increasing
accounting accruals. So, institutional investors were not myopic in pressuring firm
managers for short-term performance in their study.
As opposed to Rajgopal & Venkatachalam’s (1997) study using a lower-cost form o f
earnings management o f discretionary accruals, Bushee (1998) examined R&D cuts,
representing a more costly form o f earnings management, as related to the level o f
institutional ownership. Proposing a logit model that predicts the probability o f R&D cuts
from the percentage o f institutional ownership and a set o f control variables, Bushee
(1998) found that when institutional ownership is high, firm managers are less likely to
cut R&D expenditures to reverse an earnings decline. In other words, the presence o f
institutional investors ensures that managers choose R&D levels that maximize firm
value for the long-run instead o f meeting short-term earnings goals.
Thus, it is apparent that not all institutional investors are myopic as theorized.
Contrary to the myopic institutions theory, more plausible evidence on the long-term
orientation o f institutional investors provides theoretical support that hospitality firm
performance may be influenced through concentrated shareholdings by institutional
investors in a positive way.

Institutions as Monitoring Agents
Institutional investors, in view o f their significant shareholdings, have more incentive
to monitor firm managers from committing aberrant activities and opportunistic behavior
19
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(Bathala et al., 1994; Shleifer & Vishny, 1986). Institutions can influence corporate
management decisions by taking an active monitoring role in the decision making process
rather than selling their shareholdings when dissatisfied with firm management. The
benefits that large shareholders obtain from their monitoring efforts are more likely to
exceed the costs that they bear (Grossman & Hart, 1990; Huddart, 1993; Shleifer &
Vishny, 1986). Moreover, large ownership positions, along with greater colleetive
capacity and power, allow institutions to exert greater influence on corporate
management decisions. Possible actions taken by institutions include pressuring firm
management for a variety o f reforms, replacing firm management team, voting on
corporate management decisions and policies, and structuring executive compensation
plans (Melcher & Oster, 1993; Monks & Minow, 1995). The role that institutions play as
monitoring agents will be discussed next by reviewing institutional monitoring in the
agency framework, institutional shareholder activism, and the free rider problem.
Institutional Monitoring in the Agency Framework
Agency theory hypothesizes that because people are self-interested in the end, they
will have conflicts o f interests on certain issues when they attempt to engage in
cooperative endeavors (Jensen, 1998). The modem corporation is subject to agency
conflicts arising from the decision-making and risk-bearing functions o f the firm. Losses
derived from such conflicts and to the parties involved are termed agency costs (Jensen &
Meckling, 1976). One source o f agency costs is excessive perquisite consumption hy firm
managers. Managers have a tendency to consume excessive perks and engage in other
opportunistic behavior because they receive the full benefit o f such activity but bear less
than the full share o f the costs. Jensen & Meckling (1976) further define agency costs as
20
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the sum o f the monitoring expenditures by the principal, the bonding expenditures by the
agent and, lastly, the residual loss o f the principal. While managerial ownership and debt
leverage are two possible mechanisms to mitigate agency problems between shareholders
and management, and reduce agency costs leading to firm value enhancement (Grossman
& Hart, 1982; Harris & Raviv, 1991; Jensen, 1986; MeConnell & Servaes, 1990; Morck
et al., 1988), institutional ownership serves as an alternative monitoring mechanism o f
firm value enhancement in the agency framework (Bathala et al., 1994).
Using the two-stage least squares (2SLS) technique in a simultaneous equations
framework, Bathala et al. (1994) examined 516 firms listed on the New York Stock
Exchange (NYSE), the American Stock Exchange (AMEX) and the over-the-counter
(OTC) market in 1988 and found that institutional ownership is negatively related to both
debt ratio and managerial ownership. Firms with high debt leverage may incur higher
agency costs o f debt inherent in strict debt covenants that lower the default risk o f
creditors (Grossman & Hart, 1982). The existence o f institutional investors reduces the
need o f using debt leverage to control agency conflicts between firm managers and
shareholders, although a second type o f agency conflict between institutional investors
and creditors may exist (Keown et al., 2003). Additional monitoring provided by
institutional investors also creates less need to utilize managerial ownership to control
agency costs. Institutional investors serve as effective monitoring agents and help in
reducing agency costs. These conclusions were supported hy Crutchley et al. (1999).
Crutehley et al. (1999) argued that managers internally choose the level o f dividend
payout, debt leverage and insider ownership as mechanisms to reduce agency costs. They
hypothesize that institutional ownership serves as an external monitoring mechanism that
21
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can help reduce agency costs as well. Crutehley et al. (1999) examined 812
eross-sectional NYSE/AMEX firms in 1987 and 1993 using the three-stage least squares
(3SLS) technique in a simultaneous equations system. They found a negative relationship
between institutional ownership and the three internally-chosen mechanisms in the
sample firms in 1993. Their study suggested that managers view the outside institutional
monitoring as a substitute for the three internal monitoring mechanisms and argued the
efficient monitoring role o f institutional investors. Although their 1987 sample did not
yield significant evidence o f institutional monitoring as a substitute for other monitoring
mechanisms, the noteworthy results o f their 1993 sample documented the growth and
increasing importance o f institutional investors as monitoring agents in the agency
Iramework.
In an attempt to classify institutional investors as active monitors o f firm managers or
simply passive voters in the case o f antitakeover charter amendments (ATCA), Agrawal
& M andelker (1990) investigated the relationship between institutional ownership and the
changes in stock prices around the announcements o f ATCA using a sample o f 349
NYSE/AMEX firms between 1979-1985. When ATCAs are proposed by firm managers
to block hostile takeover attempts, the monitoring role o f large shareholders and
institutional investors, in particular, is o f critical importance because ATCAs are subject
to shareholders’ approval and could result in either a positive or negative wealth.
Agrawal & M andelker’s (1990) findings suggest that when institutional ownership is
large, the stock market reaction to ATCA proposals is more favorable. This is consistent
with the active monitoring hypothesis on the role o f institutional investors. Other studies
(Brickley et ah, 1988; Jarrell & Poulsen, 1987) also provide similar conclusions on the
22
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active monitoring role o f institutional investors in the case o f ATCA. Brickley et al.
(1988) found that when firm managers propose ATCAs that are harmful to the
shareholders, a positive relationship exists between institutional ownership and the
proportion o f shareholders voting against the proposals. Jarrell & Poulsen (1987) reported
that firms proposing detrimental ATCAs have lower institutional ownership.
Thus, the active monitoring role played by institutional investors in the agency
framework not only mitigates agency conflicts between shareholders and management,
and agency costs, but also may help increase shareholder wealth and enhance firm value
in the long run.
Institutional Shareholder Activism
The SEC’s Shareholder Proposal Rule 14a-8 provides an opportunity for a
shareholder, even one owning a relatively small amount o f a firm ’s securities, to submit
issues for inclusion in the firm’s proxy material and for presentation to a vote at an
annual meeting (U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, 2004). The rule allows
shareholders to pursue their agendas regarding corporate governance and corporate
performance through a formal mechanism. Beginning in the mid 1980s, some public
pension funds developed reputations as shareholder activists. From 1987-1994, public
pension funds sponsored 463 proxy proposals seeking changes in corporations’
governance (Gillan & Starks, 2000). Three main factors led to the emerging role o f
institutional shareholder activists. Firstly, institutional investors find it difficult to dispose
of their substantial shareholdings without taking a significant discount when dissatisfied
with firm management or firm performance. Secondly, a large portion o f institutional
investors’ portfolio that is indexed precludes them from share churning. The low turnover
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o f public pension funds reflects their levels o f indexing. CalPERS has about 10% annual
turnover in its total equity holdings while the New York State and Local Retirement
System has around 7% (Gillan & Starks, 2000). Lastly, changes in proxy rules in 1992
relaxed rigorous restrictions and have made communication and coordination among
institutional shareholders easier, and, therefore, lowered the cost o f monitoring efforts
(Admati, Pfleiderer & Zeehner, 1994). More difficulties in selling without recognizing a
huge loss, less flexibility in turning over shareholdings and less rigorous regulations
motivate public pension funds for shareholder activism and monitoring. As a result,
organizations such as Institutional Shareholders Services, Inc. (ISS) and The Council o f
Institutional Investors (CII) were established and engage in aligning institutional
investors and providing proxy voting and corporate governance services.
Private pension funds and mutual funds, on the other hand, also engage in shareholder
activism. In a survey o f 231 portfolio managers, 77% o f the respondents indicated that
they had participated in some sort o f shareholder activism in the previous year, either by
communicating directly with the board o f directors, sponsoring a shareholder resolution
or voting on shareholder proposals (Felton, 1997).
Many empirical studies on the relationship between institutional shareholder activism
and firm performance have led to mixed conclusions (Del Guereio & Hawkins, 1999;
Karpoff, Malatesta & Walkling, 1996; Martin, Kensinger & Gillan, 1996; Opler &
Sokobin, 1997; Smith, 1996; Wahal, 1996). Advocates o f institutional shareholder
activism argue that targeting firms requires closer monitoring o f firm management that is
beneficial to all shareholders o f the firm. Further, shareholder activists focus on the
long-term development o f the firms and can possibly help enhance firm performance as a
24
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result (Gillan & Starks, 2000). Examining 117 firms that had poor share price
performance during four years before being listed on the CII’s focus list between
1991-1994, Opler & Sokobin (1997) reported significant findings that the firms had
improved share performance and increased in return on assets (ROA) over the two years
following listing. Smith (1996) investigated 51 firms targeted by CalPERS between
1987-1993 and found that firms adopting proposal solutions (e.g., creating shareholder
advisory committee or restructuring executive compensation) experienced positive
abnormal returns over a longer period o f time. However, he suggested it would be
detrimental to shareholders if proposal solutions were not adopted. That is, whether
institutional shareholder activism can improve firm performance depends upon the
outcome o f firm targeting.
Opponents o f institutional shareholder activism, however, argued that institutions
may impair firm management and corrupt firm performance due to their lack o f skills and
experience in improving managers’ decisions (Lipton & Rosenblum, 1991; Wohlstetter,
1993). Studying a sample o f 125 firms targeted by five activist institutions between
1987-1993, Del Guereio & Hawkins (1999) did not find any evidence o f abnormal
returns o f the sample firms. Further, the same conclusion was made with sub-samples
grouped by sponsor, outcome and proposal topic. K arpoff et al. (1996) examined 290
firms, representing 583 shareholder proposals, and did not find any significant abnormal
returns o f the sample firms around Wall Street Journal announcements on proposals,
around proxy mailing dates, or around shareholder meeting dates. Their study did not
find significant abnormal returns following successful proposals in the long run, either.
Martin et al. (1996) analyzed the impact o f institutional shareholder activism on Sears’
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share performance. They did not find significant abnormal returns around three specific
event dates, one o f whieh was the announcement o f its listing on CalPERS’ target roster.
Examining firms targeted by the nine most active public pension funds between
1987-1993, Wahal (1996) did not find any significant relationship between shareholder
activism and long-term stock performance, or between shareholder activism and net
income.
The empirical evidence discussed above casts doubt on the efficacy o f institutional
shareholder activism in improving firm performance, even though firm performance is an
important determinant when pension funds target firms for corporate governance
proposals (Huson, 1997; John & Klein, 1995).
Free Rider Problem
Public pension funds sponsored 463 proxy proposals seeking changes in corporate
governance between 1987-1994 (Gillan & Starks, 2000); however, only 13 institutions
out of a sample o f 975, were identified as having ever submitted a shareholder proposal
during a similar period 1986-1994 (Daily, Johnson, Ellstrand & Dalton, 1996). In other
words, few institutional investors are considered activist shareholders that are willing to
spend time and money on corporate governance issues. Even if they do actively
participate in corporate governance, their spending on shareholder activism is
considerably less than that on active money management ensuring that spending on
shareholder activism will not adversely impact their returns (Black, 1997). CalPERS
spends approximately $500,000 annually, or 0.002% o f their domestic equity holdings on
all activism activities (Smith, 1996) and the Teachers Insurance Annuity
Association-College Retirement Equities Fund (TIAA-CREF) spends about $I million, or
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0.002% o f their assets (Del Guereio & Hawkins, 1999) annually, whereas active
management fees and trading costs normally range from 0.2% to 0.5% (Black, 1997).
That is, the limited expenditures on activism or corporate governance by institutional
investors implies that the benefit expected from the activity might not be able to cover the
cost incurred (Pozen, 1994). The potential for some institutional investors to free ride on
the governance efforts o f others may partially account for the lack o f attention and funds
to governance issues (Black, 1997).
The free rider problem may also be observed when individual investors who own a
small portion o f equity share the benefit o f institutional monitoring efforts without
incurring any monitoring costs. Even when individual investors have incentives to
monitor, they spend time and money studying materials in an attempt to vote for the
proposal that is most beneficial. However, their vote may not be influential; they intend
to free ride with larger shareholders or institutional investors in particular (Harford, Chen
& Li, 2004; Maug, 1998; Stoughton & Zeehner, 1998). Thus, the free rider problem
could deter institutional investors from engaging in corporate governance efforts and
possibly dilute their influence on firm performance.

Restrictions on Institutional Ownership
in the Casino Industry
W hen investing in casino firms, institutional investors are restricted by certain
regulations such as the limited percentage o f institutional ownership permitted in a casino
firm and astricted purpose o f investment (Nevada Gaming Control Board, 2005). A
review o f noteworthy state regulations on institutional ownership in easino firms in two
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representative gaming jurisdictions, Nevada and New Jersey, in the U.S., is presented as
follows.
Nevada
Regulations o f the Nevada Gaming Commission (Commission) and State Gaming
Control Board (Board) require that beneficial owners o f more than 10% o f the voting or
equity securities o f a registered casino gaming corporation apply to the Commission for a
finding o f suitability within 30 days after the Chairman o f the Board mails a written
notiee requiring such filing (Nevada Gaming Control Board, 2005). An institutional
investor with beneficial ownership o f more than 10% but not more than 15% o f a casino
firm’s voting or equity securities, however, may apply to the Commission for a waiver if
the institutional investor holds the voting or equity securities for investment purposes
only. Nevertheless, an institutional investor with a waiver approved, cannot grant an
option to purchase, sell, assign, transfer, pledge or make any disposition o f any voting or
equity securities without prior approval o f the Commission. Therefore, this highly
decreases the liquidity o f institutional shareholdings in casino firms. Regulation 15.430
(Nevada Gaming Control Board, 2005) further requires that:

Institutional investors hold and/or have held the voting or equity securities o f the
corporate licensee or the holding company for (1) investment purposes only, and
(2) in the ordinary course o f business as an institutional investor and not for the
purpose o f (a) causing, directly or indirectly, the election o f the member o f the
board o f directors, or (b) affecting any change in the corporate charter, bylaws.
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other organic document, management, policies or operations o f the corporate
licensee or any o f its affiliates (p. 174).

Institutional investors will be subjeet to lieensing, registration or a finding o f
suitability, in order to proteet publie interest, if they were found not complying with the
waiver requirements. Further, if an institutional investor subsequently changes its intent
not to hold its voting or equity seeurities for investment purpose only, it must notify the
chairman o f the Board within two business days (Nevada Gaming Control Board, 2005).
New Jersev
The Casino Control Aet in New Jersey applies similar waiver requirements to
institutional investors in its jurisdiction as Nevada. The major differences between the
two states in granting a waiver o f lieensee qualifieation for an institutional investor are
that New Jersey restricts institutional ownership to 10% o f the equity securities or 50% o f
debt securities in a easino firm, and institutional investors are given up to 30 days to
notify the New Jersey Casino Control Commission o f a change o f intent (New Jersey
Casino Control Commission^ 2005). Institutional investors applying for the waiver are
also subject to the “investment purposes only” rule.
How will these regulations affeet the relationship between institutional investors and
casino firm performance? Restrictive state regulations, placed upon institutional investors
who intend to invest intensively in the easino industry on the one hand but do not want to
be subject to rigorous rules on the other, not only may deter them from making excessive
capital investment but also may reduee their influence on corporate governance and
possibly firm performanee when exercising their fiduciary duty. Therefore, the state
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regulations imposed on institutions that are major casino firm shareholders may prevent
the institutions from exercising their colleetive power or from having any signifieant
impact on firm performance. Nevertheless, institutional investors, as long as each owns
less than 15% o f outstanding shares o f a casino firm, may act as a cohort o f investors and
collectively exert signifieant influence on casino firm performance. Therefore, a
significant impact o f institutional ownership on casino firm performance may still be
reasonably expected.

Institutional Ownership and Firm Performance
Pound (1988) argued that institutional investors may affect firm value either in a
positive or a negative manner. The positive effeet occurs when institutional investors act
as more efficient monitors o f firm managers than individual shareholders. Institutional
investors not only have greater incentives to monitor, which accompany the large
financial stakes they invest in a firm, but they also have greater expertise in monitoring
the firm at lower costs than small individual investors. The negative effect occurs when
institutional investors conspire with firm managers against their own fiduciary duty to
their beneficiaries. A third possibility, argued by Demsetz (1983), is that no relationship
between ownership structure (e.g., insider, block shareholders) and firm performance
should be observed beeause a firm ’s ownership structure is endogenously determined
such that its shareholders’ wealth is maximized. Empirical studies have shown
inconsistent results in how institutional ownership may influenee firm performance
(Agrawal & Knoeber, 1996; Chaganti & Damanpour, 1991; Clay, 2001; Craswell et ah,
1997; Han & Suk, 1998; Loderer & Martin, 1997; MeConnell & Servaes, 1990; Woidtke,
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2002). The inconclusive may stem from inconsistency in variable measurement including
firm performance measures and other control variables, sample periods, estimating
teehniques (e.g., OLS and 2SLS) and the aceountability o f the endogeneity o f a firm’s
ownership structure (Demsetz & Villalonga, 2001).
Tobin’s 0 as Firm Performance Measure
Tobin’s Q is the most commonly-adopted performance measure in modeling the
relationship between ownership structure and firm performance in previous studies (Cho,
1998; Craswell et ah, 1997; Demsetz & Villalonga, 2001; Hermalin & Weisbach, 1991;
Himmelberg et ah, 1999; Holdemess et ah, 1999; Loderer & Martin, 1997; McConnell &
Servaes, 1990; Morck et ah, 1988). It is defined as the ratio o f the year-end total market
value o f the firm to the estimated replacement costs o f total assets (Tobin, 1969). When a
firm is worth more than its value based on what it would cost to rebuild it, or when
Tohin’s Q is larger than one, excess profits are being earned and these profits are above
and beyond the level necessary to keep the firm in the industry (Lindenberg & Ross,
1981).
Lindenberg & Ross (1981) devised a formula (L-R Q) to measure Tobin’s Q, and the
majority o f the data needed was obtained from the Manufacturing Sector Master File at
the National Bureau o f Economic Research (NBER) and Standard & Poor’s
COMPUSTAT. Their formula is as follows;

^ ^
L-R Q -

(PREFST + VCOMS + LTDEBT + STD EB T- ADJ)
----(TOTASST - BKCAP + NETCAP)

31

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

where,
PREFST: the liquidating value o f a firm ’s preferred stock;
VCOMS: the price o f the firm’s common stock multiplied hy the number o f shares
outstanding on the last trading day o f the year (i.e., December 31);
LTDEBT: the value o f the firm ’s long-term debt adjusted for its age structure;
STDEBT: the book value o f the firm ’s current liabilities;
ADJ: the value o f the firm ’s net short-term assets;
TOTASST: the book value o f the firm ’s total assets;
BKCAP: the book value o f the firm ’s net capital stock; and,
NETCAP: the firm ’s inflation-adjusted net capital stock (Lindenberg & Ross, 1981).

Due to the lack o f available data for caleulating the L-R Q from NBER after 1987 and
possible diffieulty in estimating the replacement costs o f total assets (the denominator o f
Tobin’s Q), Chung & Pruitt (1994) proposed a simple approximation o f Tobin’s Q and it
was widely adopted in studies (e.g., Agrawal & Knoeber, 1996) examining the ownership
structure/firm performance relationship thereafter.
Using basie finaneial and accounting information readily available from a firm ’s
financial statements, Chung & Pruitt (1994) formulated an approximate Q that is defined
as follows:

^
(MVE + PS + DEBT)
Approximate Q = ------------— --------- —
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where,
MVE: the product of a firm’s share price and the number o f shares outstanding on the last
trading day o f the year;
PS: the liquidating value o f the firm’s outstanding preferred stock;
DEBT: the value o f the firm’s short-term liabilities net o f its short-term assets, plus the
book value o f the firm’s long-term debt; and,
TA: the hook value o f total assets o f the firm (Chung & Pruitt, 1994).

Approximate Q in their study can explain 96.6% o f the variations in L-R Q. A similar
Q measure, the simple Q, was developed by Perfect & Wiles (1994) and is defined as

follows:

^
(EQUITY + LTD + ST D + PFD + CV)
Simple Q =
--------------------------------------------ASSET

where,
EQUITY : the market value o f equity;
LTD: the book value o f long-term debt;
STD: the book value o f short-term debt;

PFD: the liquidating value o f preferred stock;
CV : the book value of eonvertible debt and convertible preferred stock; and,
ASSET : the book value o f total assets.
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Perfect & Wiles (1994) reported a correlation o f 0.93 with L-R Q.
Although accounting profit rates (e.g., return on equity “ROE”, or return on assets
“ROA”) have also heen used as firm performance measures in other studies (e.g.,
Chaganti & Damanpour, 1991; Demsetz & Lehn, 1985), two major aspects, a time
perspective and the measuring entity, differentiate Tobin’s Q from other accounting profit
measures (Demsetz & Villalonga, 2001). Firstly, as far as time perspective is coneemed,
a backward-looking accounting profit rate allows investors to look at what management
has aecomplished, while the forward-looking Tobin’s Q helps investors gauge what
management will achieve in addition to what they have already done. Secondly, for
accounting profit rate, the accountant is the entity measuring accounting performance and
is restricted by the accounting standards and constraints, while for Tobin’s Q, the
eommunity o f investors, restricted by their acumen, optimism or pessimism, are the entity
measuring firm performance involving certain investor psychology (Demsetz &
Villalonga, 2001). Tobin’s Q is more favorable than accounting profit rate to most o f the
previous researchers when modeling the ownership structure/firm performanee
relationship beeause investors do not ignore past accounting profit when determining
reasonable expectations for the future profitahility o f firms. That higher stock prices often
accompany higher accounting profit rates is reflected by the numerator o f Q. Further, the
denominator o f Q, when measured by the book value o f tangible assets rather than by
replacement costs, is similar to what accountants use in estimating the firm’s capital
investment (Demsetz & Villalonga, 2001).
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Ownership Endogeneitv
One o f the possible factors leading to inconclusive results o f the ownership
structure/firm performance relationship is the treatment o f the ownership structure
variable. Demsetz (1983) first argued that the ownership structure o f a firm, whether
coneentrated or diffused, is an endogenous outcome o f competitive selection within the
firm leading to firm value maximization. According to Demsetz (1983), ownership
endogeneity implies that the underlying conditions under whieh a firm operates
determines which ownership structure is best for shareholders. That is, an equilihrium
organization o f the firm is aehieved when various advantages and disadvantages o f
monitoring cost and cost o f production are balanced. Furthermore, Demsetz (1983)
argued that there is no reason to expect small firms with highly concentrated ownership
structures to perform better or worse than large firms with highly diffuse ownership
structures (Ftarold Demsetz, personal communieation, March 3, 2004). In other words, no
systematic relationship between ownership structure and firm performance should be
observed.
Demsetz’s (1983) view on ownership endogeneity is partially challenged by Agrawal
& Knoeber (1996). Treating the division o f shares between insiders and outsiders as an
internally-chosen decision within the firm, Agrawal & Knoeber (1996) asserted that the
level o f shareholdings by institutions is chosen externally. They further argued that
institutions make an independent choice o f the size o f their shareholdings, and, therefore,
their deeisions are not neeessarily consistent with firm value maximization. This
argument implies that a systematic relationship between institutional ownership and firm
performance may exist.
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When modeling the relationship between ownership structure and firm performance
in an endogenous framework, due to considerations such as insider information and
performance-based compensation, firm performance is at least as likely to affect
ownership structure as ownership structure is to affect firm performance. Therefore, the
impaet o f firm performance on ownership structure should be examined simultaneously
while investigating the impact o f ownership structure on firm performance if ownership
endogeneity is to be accounted for (Demsetz & Villalonga, 2001). Other studies (Cho,
1998; Clay, 2001; Demsetz & Lehn, 1985; Demsetz & Villalonga, 2001; Holdemess et
ah, 1999; Loderer & Martin, 1997) echoed Demsetz and provided further evidenee o f the
endogeneity o f ownership straeture when modeling the relationship between ownership
stmcture (e.g., insider, bloekholder, and institutional) and firm performanee. In some
studies where ownership structure was treated endogenously, firm performance measure
was found to affeet ownership structure but not the reverse. Cho (1998) examined the
relationship between insider ownership and firm performance measured by Tobin’s Q
using 326 o f the 500 largest U.S. firms {Fortune 500) in 1991, and found that insider
ownership inereases significantly with Tobin’s Q, but not vice versa. Demsetz &
Villalonga (2001) studied how large shareholders may relate to firm performance
measured hy Tobin’s Q using a 223-firm random sub-sample o f the sample in the original
Demsetz & Lehn’s (1985) study. They elaimed that firm performance impacts large
shareholder ownership in a simultaneous framework but no evidenee to support the
notion that variations across firms in observed ownership structures lead to systematic
variations in firm performance. Loderer & Martin (1997) also tested the relationship
between insider ownership and firm performance measured by Tobin’s Q using
36
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acquisition data which includes 867 firms between 1978-1988. They reported that insider
ownership decreases signifieantly with Tobin’s Q but the reverse is not evidenced.
Nevertheless, treating institutional ownership endogenously. Clay (2001) provided
empirical evidence showing that institutional ownership increases firm value as measured
hy a proxy for Tobin’s Q. His study will be reviewed in the next seetion o f this chapter.
Empirical Studies on the Institutional Ownership
and Firm Performanee Relationship
Agrawal & Knoeber (1996) examined firm performance and seven mechanisms to
control agency problems between managers and shareholders based on a list o f 383
Fortune 800 firms in 1987. In their study firm performance was measured by a simple Q

devised by Perfeet & Wiles (1994). Agrawal & Knoeber (1996) first regressed firm
performanee on the entire set o f control mechanisms using OLS and later considered
inter-correlation among the control mechanisms, incorporating firm performance and all
the control mechanisms in a simultaneous equations framework using 2SLS. They found
institutional ownership, one tested mechanism, an insignificant determinant o f firm
performance in both the OLS and 2SLS results. In addition, only board composition out
o f all the seven control mechanisms examined had a signifieant impaet on firm
performance echoing Demsetz & Lehn’s (1985) study that choices o f control mechanisms
are made so as to maximize firm value. Other firm speeific control variables included
were firm size by log o f total assets, R&D expenditures to total assets, advertising
expenditures to total assets and dummy variables for regulated firms and those listed on
NYSE.
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In an attempt to examine institutional investors’ potential influence on the firm ’s
capital structure and the firm’s financial performance, Chaganti & Damanpour (1991)
examined 40 pairs o f firms in 40 industries in the U.S. manufacturing sector continuously
surveyed by the Value L ine between 1983-1985. Firms with the highest and lowest
three-year average institutional shareholdings in each o f the 40 industries were selected
for a total o f 80 firms in their study. Long-term debt as a percentage o f the firm ’s total
capital was used as a measure o f the firm ’s capital structure, while four accounting
measures, namely, the percentage o f return on assets (ROA) measuring the efficiency
with which total assets are managed, the percentage o f return on equity (ROE) measuring
the efficiency with which shareholders’ investments are managed, the price/eamings (P/E)
ratio reflecting a relative value o f the firm’s stock in the market and, lastly, percentage of
total stock returns capturing income to shareholders in the form o f dividends and capital
gains, were used as financial performance measures. The results o f their study showed
that all four financial measures for the group with the highest institutional ownership are
higher than those for the group with the lowest institutional ownership; however, only the
difference between the two groups on ROE is statistically significant. Furthermore,
institutional ownership was found to help lower the long-term debt-to-capital ratio. This
implies that institutional shareholders m ay serve as efficient monitoring agents in lieu o f
creditors.
In probing the relationship between institutional ownership and firm performance
where institutional ownership was treated endogenously, Clay (2001) examined 8,951
firms between 1988-1999. He found empirical evidence supporting a positive impact of
institutional ownership on firm performance, as measured by proxy Q, not only in the
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OLS model but also in a simultaneous equations framework using the 2SLS technique.
Specifically, Clay’s (2001) results suggested that a one percent increase in institutional
ownership translates to a 0.75% enhancement in firm performance. Proxy Q in his study
was calculated as:

Proxy 0 =

(ASSET + E Q U IT Y -(C E + DT))

j\ssEnr

where,
ASSET : the book value of total assets;
EQUITY : the market value o f equity;
CE: the book value of common equity; and,
D T: deferred taxes.

In particular, this proxy Q has been empirically used by previous researchers
(Gompers et al., 2003; Kaplan & Zingales, 1997) and will be adopted in this dissertation
to measure firm performance in the hospitality industry. The S&P 500 Index was used as
an instrumental variable for institutional ownership in Clay’s (2001) study. Other control
variables included firm size by log o f sales, firm age, time trend, R&D expenditures to
total assets, and industry membership. No reverse impact o f firm performance on
institutional ownership w as assessed in his study.

Craswell et al. (1997) examined the effect o f institutional ownership on firm
performance with two cross-sectional Australian samples, further divided by firm size,
for 1986 and 1989 respectively. A total o f 82 large and 81 small firms in the 1986
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sub-sample and 95 large and 91 small firms in 1989 formed the four groups. Firm
performance was measured by a proxy for Tobin’s Q and was defined as the ratio of
market value o f equity to book value o f net assets. Craswell et al. (1997) first regressed
their proxy Q on insider ownership and insider ownership squared, and later added
institutional ownership as an additional explanatory variable to the regression equation in
the four groups. They failed to find any empirical evidence supporting the hypothetic
relationship between institutional ownership and firm performance. Other control
variables included in the performance equation were financial leverage measured by debt
ratio, firm size by log o f total assets, R&D expenditures to total assets and industry
membership dummy variables.
Using long-term stock returns as a measure o f firm performance for 301
NYSE/AMEX firms during 1988-1992, Han & Suck (1998) examined the effect o f
insider ownership and institutional ownership simultaneously on firm performance while
other variables (e.g., size o f the firm, eamings/price ratio) that may cause spurious
relationships between interested variables were controlled. They found that stock returns,
represented by the geometric average return for the five year period for the firms, are
positively related to institutional ownership at the 10% significance level. Han & Suck
(1998) further divided the sample into three sub-samples representing the high, medium
and low institutional ownership groups, and institutional ownership was still found to he
a significant determinant o f firm performance as evidenced by the F test and
Kruskal-Wallis test conducted. They attributed this observed significant relationship to
effective monitoring o f firm management by institutional investors.
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In investigating the relationship between executive ownership and firm performance
in the context o f 867 acquisitions o f puhlicly-traded firms in the U.S. between 1978-1988,
Loderer & Martin (1997) estimated a simultaneous equations model where insider
ownership by managers and directors and firm performance measured by a simple Q
(Perfect & Wiles, 1994) were the two dependent variables for the two equations
respectively. Institutional ownership, added as an additional explanatory variable in the
performance equation in addition to other control variables, was not found to be a
significant determinant o f firm performance. Other control variables included in the study
were logarithmic transformation o f net sales measuring firm size, industry membership
dummy variables, and standard deviation o f stock returns.
McConnell & Servaes (1990) hypothesized that the value o f a firm is a function o f the
distribution o f equity ownership among corporate insiders, individual atomistic
shareholders, block shareholders and institutional investors. They tested their hypothesis
using a cross-sectional sample o f 1,173 firms listed on NYSE/AMEX in 1976 and
another 1,093 firms in 1986. In their study, McConnell & Servaes (1990) employed a
proxy for Tobin’s g as a measure for firm performance. Their proxy for Tobin’s Q was
similar to what Chung & Pruitt (1994) proposed, although McConnell & Servaes (1990)
used the replacement value o f total assets in the denominator. The control variables
included along with the ownership variables in the regression equation were financial
leverage measured as the market value o f debt divided by the replacement value o f total
assets, R&D intensity measured as R&D expenditures for the year divided by the
replacement value o f total assets, advertising intensity measured as advertising
expenditures divided by the replacement value o f total assets, and, lastly, the replacement
41
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value o f total assets representing firm size. The results o f McConnell & Servaes’ (1990)
study showed a significant and positive impact o f institutional ownership on firm
performance. They further claimed that such a relationship reveals an efficient
monitoring role assumed by institutional investors.
Heterogeneous Institutions and Firm Performance
As mentioned in Chapter One, different types o f institutions reveal different
investment behaviors and pursue diverse objectives subject to various conditions and
constraints. That is, considering the heterogeneity o f institutions when modeling the
institutional ownership/firm performance relationship may reveal different results subject
to institution types, objectives and incentive structures, as opposed to previous studies
treating all institutions as homogenous.
In examining the relationship between firm performance, as measured by adjusted Q,
and two types o f pension funds—pubhc and private, using a pooled sample o f 359
Fortune 500 firms between 1989-1993, W oidtke (2002) found that adjusted Q is

positively related to ownership by private pension funds but negatively related to
ownership by public pension funds using 2SLS in a simultaneous equations framework.
She argued that the positive effect associated with private pension funds is consistent
with the larger, more performance-based compensation for private pension fund
administrators leading to a convergence o f interests with other shareholders, while the
negative effect associated with public pension fund ownership is driven by the ownership
o f public pension funds that focus on firms with poor corporate governance issues.
Adjusted Q equals to a firm’s Tobin’s Q less the median Q for its industry. Other control
variables included were financial leverage measured by debt ratio, R&D expenditures to
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total assets, advertising expenditures to total assets and firm replacement value (Woidtke,
2002^

A summary o f previous empirical studies on the institutional ownership/firm
performance relationship is presented in Table 1.
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Table 1 Summary of Previous Studies Examining the Institutional Ownership/Firm Performance Relationship

Author

8
(O '

Sample &
Period

Institutional
Ownership
Variable
The
percentage of
shares held by
institutions

Agrawal &
Knoeber
(1996)

383 Fortune
800 firms in
1987

Chaganti &
Damanpour
(1991)

80 U.S.
manufacturing
firms between
1983-1985

The
percentage of
shares held by
institutions

Clay (2001)

8,951 firms
between
1988-1999

The
percentage of
shares held by
institutions

Craswell,
Taylor &
Saywell
(1997)

349 Australian
firms in 1986
&19M

The
percentage of
shares held by
institutions

Performance
Measure
Simple Q

3.
3"
CD
CD

■D
O
Q.
C

a
o
3
"O
o
CD

Q.

■CDD
C/)
C/)

(1) Return on
assets (ROA);
(2) Return on
equity (ROE);
(3) Price/eamings
(P/E) ratio;
G ) Percentage of
stock returns
Proxy Q

Proxy for Tobin’s
Q

Control Variable
(1) Firm size by log o f
total assets;
(2) R&D expenditures to
total assets;
(3) Advertising
expenditures to total assets;
(4) dummy variables for
regulated & NYSE listed
firms
Stockholdings by
corporate executives

(1) Firm size by log o f
sales;
(2) Time trend;
(3) Firm age;
(4) R&D expenditures to
total assets
(1) Financial leverage by
debt ratio;
(2) Firm size by log o f
total assets;
(3) R&D expenditures to
total assets;
(4) Industry membership
dummy variable

Statistical
Method

Ownership
Endogenous?

Results

OLS & 2SLS

Yes

No relationship
between institutional
ownership & firm
performance for both
OLS & 2SLS

Hierarchical
multiple
regression

No

Performance
measures are higher
for the group with
higher institutional
ownership

OLS & 2SLS

Yes

Linear &
curvilinear
regression

No

Institutional
ownership has
positive impact on
firm performance; no
reverse relationship
was assessed
No relationship
between institutional
ownership & firm
performance

CD

■D
O
Q.
C

8

Q.

■CDD
C/)
C/)

8
ci'

Han &
Suck (1998)

301
NYSE/AMEX
firms

Loderer &
Martin
(1997)

867 U.S. firms
between
1978-1988

McCormell
& Servaes
(1990)

33 "

The
percentage of
shares held by
institutions
The
percentage of
shares held by
institutions

Long-term stock
returns

2,266
NYSE/AMEX
firms in 1976
&19M

The
percentage of
shares held by
institutions

Proxy for Tobin’s
Ô

1,765 Fortune
500 firms
between
1989-1993

The
percentage of
shares held by
private and
public pension
funds

Adjusted T obin’s

Simple Q

CD
CD

■D
O
Q.
C

a
O
3
■D
O
CD
Q.

■CDD
C/)
C/)

LA Woidtke
(2002)

(1) Systematic risk (beta);
(2) Firm size by log of
m arket value o f equity;
(3) E/P ratio
(1) Firm size by log o f net
sales;
(2) Industry membership
dummy variable;
(3) S.D. o f stock returns
(1) Financial leverage by
debt ratio;
(2) R&D expenditures to
total assets;
(3) Advertising
expenditures to total
assets;
(4) the replacement value
o f total assets
(1) Financial leverage by
debt ratio;
(2) R&D expenditures to
total assets;
(3) Advertising
expenditures to total
assets;
(4) the replacement value
o f total assets

W eighted
least-squares

No

Institutional
ownership has
positive impact on
firm performance
No relationship
between institutional
ownership & firm
performance

OLS & 2SLS

Yes

OLS

No

Institutional
ownership has
positive impact on
firm performance

2SLS

Yes

Private pension funds
have positive impact
on firm performance
while public pension
funds have negative
impact on firm
performance

Summary
Previous research on the relationship between institutional ownership and firm
performance has shown mixed results as to the direction of causality, the treatment of
ownership structure endogeneity, the monitoring role o f institutional investors, the
industries investigated, the control variables selected, and the time period sampled. The
review o f related literature guides the direction o f this dissertation in examining the
institutional ownership/firm performance relationship in the hospitality industry, and the
next chapter will focus on the methodology.
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CHAPTER 3

METHODOLOGY
The review o f the existing literature in Chapter Two provides both a theoretical and
empirical foundation for variable selection and statistical technique adoption in this
dissertation for testing the relationship between institutional ownership and firm
performance in the hospitality industry. Ownership endogeneity argued by Demsetz
(1983) and evidenced by other empirical studies (e.g., Clay, 2001) suggests simultaneous
determination o f institutional ownership and firm performance. Furthermore, Demsetz &
Villalonga (2001) suggested that firm performance is at least as likely to affect ownership
structure as ownership structure is to affect firm performance. That is, a simultaneous
equations system consisting o f two equations, with institutional ownership and firm
performance as the dependent variables will be estimated using the 2SLS technique if
deemed proper. In a system comprised o f interdependent endogenous variables, the 2SLS
technique is preferred over OLS as the latter would lead to biased and inconsistent
parameter estimates (Wooldridge, 2003). The first section o f this chapter will present the
hypotheses constructed for this dissertation, and the next several sections will then
describe the development o f the proposed model, the statistical techniques adopted, the
underlying assumptions for the statistical techniques, and the sample and data used for
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testing the model. Lastly, the proposed model will be tested using the data collected for
the three sectors (i.e., restaurant, casino and hotel) o f the hospitality industry.

Hypotheses
In consideration o f the research questions stated in Chapter One and in review o f
related literature in Chapter Two, the following hypotheses will be tested in this
dissertation:

HYPOTHESIS I:

Institutional ownership will have a positive impact on firm
performance in the restaurant sector;

HYPOTHESIS II:

Institutional ownership will have a positive impact on firm
performance in the casino sector; and.

HYPOTHESIS III:

Institutional ownership will have a positive impact on firm
performance in the hotel sector.

The Proposed Simultaneous Equations Model
In view o f the research questions o f whether institutional ownership influences firm
performance in the hospitality industry and in consideration o f potential firm-specific
variables that might influence firm performance, the first proposed equation [Eq. (1)],
employing firm performance as the dependent variable and institutional ownership as one
o f the independent variables, is described as follows:

e = po + pi INST + P2 SIZE + P3DEBT + P4 FIX + £,,
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(1)

where,
Q\ proxy Q\

INST : the percentage o f outstanding shares held by institutions;
SIZE; log o f total assets;
DEBT : the book value o f debt as a fraction o f the book value o f total assets;
FIX: expenditures on fixed plant and equipment as a fraction o f sales revenues;
Po: constant;

P1-P4: coefficient; and,
£] : error term.

Here, employing proxy Q as the performance measure, Eq. (1) is a natural OLS
equation with INST as one o f the independent variables, along with other firm-specific
control variables including SIZE, DEBT, and FIX. However, OLS estimation alone in Eq.
( 1 ) will be inconsistent and biased if it contains at least one endogenous explanatory
variable (Wooldridge, 2003). Due to the suspicious endogeneity o f the institutional
ownership variable (i.e., INST) as evidenced in some previous studies (e.g.. Clay, 2001)
that may produce inconsistent and biased coefficient estimates in Eq. (1), a second OLS
model [Eq. (2)], with INST as the dependent variable and Q and other firm-specific
variables including SIZE, ROA, BETA, DEBT and DIV as the independent variables, is
specified and described as follows:

IN S T = po + P1Ô + P2SIZE + P3R O A + P 4B E T A + P sD E B T + PeD IV + £2,
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(2 )

where,
INST: the percentage o f outstanding shares held by institutions;
g : proxy g ;
SIZE: log o f total assets;
ROA: net income divided by total assets;
BETA: systematic risk;
DEBT: the book value o f debt as a fraction o f the book value o f total assets;
DIV: dividend payout ratio;
Po: constant;
Pi_p6 : coefficient; and,
£2 : error term.

The independent variables in Eq. (2) not only act as potential determinants o f
institutional ownership for hospitality firms, but, more importantly, some o f them play
the role o f instrumental variables for INST in the first stage o f the 2SLS technique if
2SLS is deemed proper for this dissertation. Thus, a simultaneous two-equation model
consisting o f Eqs. (1) and (2) is specified. The reasons for selecting the specific
independent variables will be provided later in the subsection

00

Independent Variables.

The simultaneous equations model is essentially a combination o f two OLS models in a
simultaneous framework where Q and INST are the two interdependent endogenous
variables jointly determined in the system. A graphical representation o f the proposed
simultaneous equations model is shown in Figure 1.
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Figure I . The Proposed Simultaneous Equations Model

Dependent Variables
The two dependent variables are a proxy for Tobin’s Q (i.e., proxy Q) in Eq. (1) and
institutional ownership (i.e., INST) in Eq. (2). Due to a possible distortion from the
estimation of replacement costs o f total assets when calculating Tobin’s Q using the L-R
procedures, a proxy for Tobin’s Q, as widely used by previous studies (Clay 2001;
Gompers et al., 2003; Kaplan & Zingales, 1997), was used as a measure o f firm
performance in this dissertation. Proxy Q is defined as follows:

Proxy Q =

(ASSET + EQUITY - (CE + DT))
ASSET
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where, ASSET is the book value o f total assets, EQUITY is the market value o f common
equity, CE is the book value o f common equity, and DT is deferred taxes.
Institutional ownership (INST) is defined as the year-end percentage o f outstanding
ordinary shares o f firms owned by financial institutions. Institutional investment
managers are required to report their shareholdings in Form 13F to the SEC quarterly if
they exercise investment discretion o f $100 million or more in Section 13(f) securities
(U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, 2004). Section 13(f) securities generally
include equity securities that trade on an exchange or are quoted on the National
Association o f Securities Dealers Automated Quotation (NASDAQ), equity options and
warrants, shares o f closed-end investment companies, and convertible bonds. Form 13F
requires disclosure o f the names o f institutional investment managers, the names and
classes o f the securities managed, the Committee on Uniform Securities Identification
Procedures (CUSIP) number, the number o f shares owned, and the total market value o f
each security (U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, 2004).
In addition, INST and Q also serve as possible endogenous, or pure exogenous,
explanatory variables in Eqs. (1) and (2).
Independent Variables
When examining the relationship between institutional ownership and firm
performance, various firm-specific characteristics should be controlled for the possibility
o f their causing spurious correlation between institutional ownership and firm
performance (Welch, 2003). One way o f controlling firm-specific characteristics is to
include and model them together with the interested variables (i.e., Q and INST). All the
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independent variables discussed below are control variables and are used in either one or
both o f Eqs. (1) and (2).
Firm size (SIZE), measured by log o f total assets, is included in both Eqs. (1) and (2)
to account for the possibility that firm size may affect firm performance, institutional
ownership or both. The amount o f total assets may vary from firm to firm, and large
discrepancies may exist among different firms. Logarithmic transformation o f total assets
can stretch extremely small values and condense extremely large values o f total assets
and make data more normally distributed (Clark, 1984). Transformation o f data also
reduces the impact of outliers (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2001). For Eq. (1), since growth
opportunities and Tobin’s Q are likely lower for larger firms (Agrawal & Knoeber, 1996)
and firm size was found negatively related to firm performance in previous studies
(Agrawal & Knoeber, 1996; Craswell et al., 1997; Crutchley et al., 1999; McConnell &
Servaes, 1990; Morck et ah, 1988; Woidtke, 2002), a negative relationship between
proxy Q and firm size is expected. For Eq. (2), previous studies (Crutchley et al., 1999;
Herman, 1981; O ’Brien & Bhushan, 1990) showed that institutional investors are more
likely to buy stocks o f large firms, possibly due to the fact that those firms have the
resources and capacity to reduce the risk o f their investment in projects and are less
subject to risk o f bankruptcy (Tong & Ning, 2004). Thus, a positive relationship between
institutional ownership and firm size is anticipated.
Debt ratio (DEBT), representing firm leverage and calculated as total debt divided by
total assets, is included in both Eqs. (1) and (2). For Eq. (1), first, debt ratio serves to
capture a value-enhancing effect o f corporate tax shields that could result in higher values
o f performance indicators, including Tobin’s Q (Morck et al., 1988). Second, as
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suggested by the pecking order theory, well-performing firms in terms o f their
profitability are likely to be less-leveraged because they tend to finance their future
projects with internally generated earnings first (Morck et ah, 1988; Myers & Majluf,
1984; Tong & Ning, 2004; Welch, 2003). Lastly, debt ratio can further capture a
value-enhancing (reducing) effect when future interest payment obligations are paid back
with relatively less (more) valuable money than was borrowed when a relative inflation
(deflation) was observed (Demsetz & Villalonga, 2001). Therefore, either a positive or a
negative relationship between firm leverage and firm performance can be expected in Eq.
(1). For Eq. (2), firm leverage may serve, on the one hand, as the level o f monitoring o f
firm management provided by creditors that otherwise would have come from equity
holders (Demsetz & Villalonga, 2001). On the other hand, firm leverage may serve as a
signal o f possible bankruptcy risk o f the firm. A highly-leveraged firm may discourage
institutional investors from holding shares o f such firm, and, therefore, a negative effect
o f debt leverage on INST is projected.
Accounting distortion can also arise from how fixed assets (e.g., plant & equipment)
are depreciated over their useful life (Demsetz & Villalonga, 2001). Different
depreciation methods (e.g., straight-line, sum o f the years digit, etc.) can yield different
book values o f the same fixed assets and possibly distort proxy Q, in that the book value
of total assets represents the denominator o f proxy Q. Expenditures on fixed plant and
equipment, or capital expenditures, as a fraction o f sales revenues (FDC) is therefore also
included in Eq. (1) as in other studies (Demsetz & Villalonga, 2001; Welch, 2003) and
can either result in a positive or a negative impact on proxy Q.
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ROA, defined as net income divided by total assets measuring firm profitability, is
included in Eq. (2) to show whether institutional investors are more attracted to firms
with higher profitability. O ’Barr & Conley (1992) argued that financial institutions tend
to invest in highly profitable firms so as to fulfill their fiduciary duty to their investors,
and their argument was supported empirically by Crutchley et al. (1999). Therefore, in Eq.
(2) a positive relationship between ROA and INST is expected.
BETA, or the systematic risk o f a firm’s stock, is included in Eq. (2) to represent the
undiversifiable portion o f the investment risk inherent in stock ownership that may affect
institutional investors’ decision to hold a certain stock. O ’Brien and Bhushan (1990)
found that BETA is positively related to institutional ownership possibly because
institutional investors have incentives to invest in high-risk securities for higher return on
their portfolios, hence higher compensation for themselves. However, Crutchley et al.
(1999) found evidence that institutional ownership and BETA are negatively related in
their 1987 sample and positively related in 1993. Therefore, either a positive or a
negative relationship between INST and BETA m ay be expected in Eq. (2).
DIV, representing dividend payout ratio and estimated as dividends divided by
income before extraordinary items adjusted for common stock equivalents
(COMPUSTAT, 2003), is included in Eq. (2) to show whether dividend payouts would
influence institutional investors’ decision to hold a firm ’s stock. On the one hand,
institutional investors seek a higher return, including dividend income, to carry out their
fiduciary duty. Empirical evidence has shown that a higher dividend payout ratio leads to
larger institutional ownership (Allen, Bernardo & Welch, 2000; Crutchley et al., 1999;
Short, Zhang & Keasey, 2002). Grinstein & M ichaely (2005) also reported that
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institutional investors prefer dividend-paying firms to non-dividend-paying ones, but
among firms that pay dividends, lower-dividend-paying firms are favored. On the other
hand, a negative relationship may also be expected since institutional investors may
prefer firms that retain earnings for future reinvestment purposes rather than pay high
levels o f dividends, possibly due, in part, to dual-taxation on dividend income that might
have caused institutions to prefer low/no dividend (Tong & Ning, 2004). Table 2 shows
expected signs o f the coefficients o f the independent/explanatory variables in Eqs. (1)
and (2 ).

Table 2 Expected Signs o f the Coefficients o f Explanatory Variables
Eq. (1)

Eq. (2)
INST

Dependent Variable
Explanatory Variable

-t-

Ô
INST

+

SIZE

-

DEBT

+ /-

FIX

+ /-

4-

ROA

-h

BETA

+ /-

DIV

+ /-
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Statistical Techniques
All statistical techniques will be performed with the assistance o f SPSS software
version 11.0. The following sections will describe the statistical techniques adopted for
this dissertation.
The Durbin-Wu-Hausman Test
Previous studies suggest the use o f the 2SLS technique when modeling the ownership
structure/firm performance relationship because o f the endogeneity o f ownership
structure in the firm. Thus, in this dissertation, the suspicious endogenous variable,
institutional ownership, will be tested first for endogeneity before applying the 2SLS
technique to the proposed model. The Durbin-Wu-Hausman (DWH) test for checking the
endogeneity o f INST in Eq. (1) will be performed to justify the use o f 2SLS in the
equation (Davidson & MacKinnon, 1993). If the DWH test suggests that INST is an
endogenous explanatory variable in Eq. (1), meaning it is correlated with the error term
o f Eq. (1), 2SLS will be applied to estimate the equation; otherwise, OLS estimation
alone on Eq. (1) will suffice. In a similar vein, Q in Eq. (2) may be an endogenous
explanatory variable, and, therefore, the DWH test will also be performed on Q to justify
the use of 2SLS in the equation.
The DWH test will be performed in two steps using the following sample
simultaneous equations (3) and (4).

Yi =ao + ai*Y2 + a2*Xi-4ei,

(3)

Y 2 = bo+ b]*X 2 + b2*X3 +

(4)

02,
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where, Y] is a suspicious endogenous variable and Y| is the dependent variable in Eq. (3),
X i, X 2 and X 3 are exogenous variables and e, and

02

are the error terms. The first step of

the DWH test is to perform a regression in which the suspicious endogenous variable (i.e.,
Y 2 ) regresses against all exogenous variables (i.e., X,, X 2 , and X 3) in the system; or

Y2 =

Co + Cl *Xi

+ C2 * X 2 + C3*X3 + 63,

(5)

and residuals o f Eq. (5), Y 2_res, are saved. In the second step, Y 2_res is added as an
additional independent variable to Eq. (3) and another regression is performed; or

Y i = d o + d i * Y 2 + d 2 * X , + d 3Y 2_ r e s + 04,

(6 )

If ds, the coefficient o f Y 2_res, is significantly different from zero in a t-test, meaning
Y 2 is an endogenous explanatory variable correlating with the error term o f Eq. (3), OLS
estimation on Eq. (3) is both inconsistent and biased, and, therefore, 2SLS is necessary
(Cong, 2004).
Using Eqs. (1) and (2) in this study for illustration, firstly, an OLS regression is run
where the suspicious “endogenous” variable, or INST, is regressed against all six
exogenous variables in Eqs. (1) and (2), namely SIZE, DEBT, FIX, ROA, BETA and
DIV, and the residuals (i.e., INST res) are saved; or

E 4 S T = po + Pi S IZ E + P 2D E B T + P3FIX + P4R O A + P 5B E T A + PeD IV ,
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(7 )

Secondly, INST res obtained from Eq. (7) is then added to Eq. (1) as an additional
independent variable and another OLS regression is run; or

0 = Po + PiINST + P2SIZE + P 3D E B T + P4FIX + p 5 lNST_res,

(8 )

If the coefficient o f INST res obtained from Eq. ( 8 ), or P$, is significantly different
from zero in a t-test, the OLS result obtained from Eq. (1) will be both inconsistent and
biased, and, therefore, the use o f the 2SLS technique is justified and should be applied to
Eq. (1) (Cong, 2004). Since the DWH test is not a built-in function o f SPSS, manual
operation o f the DWH test is performed with the assistance o f SPSS’s linear regression
function.
Two-Stage Least Squares Technique
After performing the DWH test, if INST is found to be an endogenous explanatory
variable in Eq. (1), the 2SLS technique will be employed in estimating the coefficients in
the equation. Similarly, the 2SLS technique will be adopted in Eq. (2) if Q is found to be
endogenous. The following simultaneous equations (9) and (10) serve as an example for
illustration o f the 2SLS technique:

Yi = po + P1Y 2 + P2 Z 1 + ei,

(9)

Y2 = Po + PiY] + P2Z1 + P3Z2+ P4Z3 + 62,

(10)

where, Y 2 is an endogenous explanatory variable in Eq. (9), Z,, Z 2 and Z 3 are exogenous
variables and e, and

02

are the error terms.
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The first stage is to run an OLS regression in which Yi is the dependent variable and
Zi, Z 2 and Z 3 are the independent variables; or

( 11)

Y2 = Po + PiZi + P2Z2+P3Z3 + 63,

and the predicted (fitted) values o f Y 2 , denoted as Y ^, are obtained from Eq. (11). The
first stage serves to find a 2SLS estimator for Y 2 (i.e., Y^ ) in Eq. (9) using all exogenous
variables (i.e., X i, X% and X 3) as instrumental variables.
In the second stage, o f Eq. (9), Y 2 is replaced by

and another OLS regression is

then run on Eq. (9); or

Yi = Po + PiY; + P2Z] + C],

(12)

The estimation o f the coefficient in Eq. (12) is now both consistent and unbiased
(Wooldridge, 2003).
Next, Eqs. (1) and (2) in this dissertation are used for illustration. In the first stage,
the predicted (fitted) values o f INST, or INST (i.e., the 2SLS estimator), are obtained
by regressing INST against all exogenous variables in Eqs. (1) and (2)— SIZE, DEBT,
FIX, ROA, BETA and DIV; or

INST = po + pi SIZE + P2DEBT + P3FIX + P4 ROA + PsBETA + PeDIV + fi.
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(13)

In the second stage, of Eq. (1), EMST is replaced by INST and another OLS
regression is run on Eq. (1); or

6

= po + Pi INST + P 2 SIZE + p 3DEBT + p4FIX + f,.

(14)

The estimation o f the coefficient in Eq. (14) is then both consistent and unbiased
(Wooldridge, 2003).
In SPSS, the 2SLS technique is performed using a built-in 2SES regression function
where three mandatory lists are required for input; the dependent variable, the list o f
explanatory variables (both exogenous and endogenous), and the entire list o f
instrumental variables (i.e., all exogenous variables). 2SLS regression output is similar to
that for OLS (Wooldridge, 2003).
Assumptions o f The Two-Stage Least Squares
The 2SLS technique is not performed without assumptions. Since the 2SLS technique
is essentially an OLS regression with a 2SLS estimator performed in two stages, the
underlying assumptions that apply to OLS should also be checked when applying the
2SLS technique. The assumption o f normality states that the errors (or the dependent
variable) has a normal distribution, conditional on the explanatory variables; the
assumption o f linearity states that there is a straight-line relationship between two
variables (where one or both o f the variables can be combinations o f several variables);
and the assumption o f homoscedasticity states that the errors in a regression model have
constant variance, conditional on the explanatory variables (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2001 ;
Wooldridge, 2003). Under OLS, assumptions such as normality, linearity and
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homoscedasticity o f residuals can be examined by residuals scatterplots in which one axis
is predicted scores o f the dependent variable and the other axis is errors o f prediction
(Tabachnick & Fidell, 2001). The same tool will be applied under 2SLS in this study to
examine normality, linearity and homoscedasticity.
Another relevant assumption for the 2SLS technique is the identification issue for the
equations. Over-identification or just-identification (exact-identification) o f equations is
both necessary (i.e., order condition) and sufficient (i.e., rank condition) for the 2SLS
technique to produce consistent estimators o f the P coefficient (Wooldridge, 2003). The
order condition for identification o f an equation means that there exists at least as many
excluded exogenous variables as there are included endogenous explanatory variables in
the equation (Wooldridge, 2003). An equation is over-identified when the number o f
excluded exogenous variables is larger than that o f right-hand endogenous explanatory
variables, while an equation is just-identified when the number o f excluded exogenous
variables is equal to that o f right-hand endogenous explanatory variables. On the other
hand, the rank condition for identification states that the first equation in a two-equation
simultaneous system is identified if, and only if, the second equation includes at least one
exogenous variable excluded from the first equation and the coefficient o f the excluded
exogenous variable is not zero (Wooldridge, 2003).
In this dissertation, Q and INST are the two endogenous variables while the six
exogenous variables are SIZE, DEBT, FIX, ROA, BETA and DIV. Eq. (1) is
over-identified and Eq. (2) is just-identified, because the number o f excluded exogenous
variables from the equations is at least as large as the number o f right-hand endogenous
variables (Wooldridge, 2003). In other words, in Eq. (1), only SIZE, DEBT, and FIX are
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included as exogenous explanatory variables, and, therefore, ROA, BETA and DIV are
considered three excluded exogenous variables from the equation with INST being the
endogenous explanatory variable on the right-hand side o f the equation. The number o f
excluded exogenous variables (i.e., ROA, BETA and DIV) is larger than that o f
right-hand endogenous variable (i.e., INST), resulting in over-identification o f Eq. (1).
Similarly, in Eq. (2), FIX is not included and therefore is considered an excluded
exogenous variable while Q is the endogenous one. The number o f excluded exogenous
variables (i.e., FIX) is equal to that o f right-hand endogenous variables (i.e., Q), resulting
in just-identification o f Eq. (2). Furthermore, the rank condition for identification for Eq.
( 1 ) can be checked only after data analysis if at least one o f the excluded exogenous
variables from Eq. (1) has a non-zero coefficient in Eq. (2). That is, the rank condition for
identification is met for Eq. (1) if at least one o f the coefficients for ROA, BETA and
DIV in Eq. (2) is non-zero. Similarly, the rank condition for identification is met for Eq.
(2) if the coefficient for FIX in Eq. (1) is not zero.
Multicollinearitv
One o f the underlying assumptions for linear regression models states that there is no
exact linear relationship between the independent variables in the equation. However, the
issue o f multicollinearity is said to exist when two or more independent variables are
approximately linearly-related in the sample data (Kennedy, 2003). Although the OLS
estimator in the presence o f multicollinearity remains unbiased and the R-squared is
unaffected, the variances o f the OLS estimates o f the parameters o f the collinear variables
are quite large (Kennedy, 2003). The variance o f the coefficient for Xj is calculated as:
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where,

is the error variance, SSTj is the total sample variations in variable Xj and Rj^ is

the variations in Xj explained by other independent variables. When serious
multicollinearity exists, larger variances o f the OLS estimates o f the parameters will
result in smaller t statistics and make it harder to reject the null hypothesis. In other
words, it will be more likely to commit a Type II error under serious multicollinearity
(Neter, Kutner, Nachtsheim & Wasserman, 1996). Multicollinearity is not deemed a
“problem” by some scholars since it can be eliminated by increasing sample size; thus,
increasing SSTj in Eq. (15). More importantly, the parameter o f interest may be
uncorrelated with other collinear variables that will not affect the variance o f the
interested parameter.
Nevertheless, multicollinearity can be more serious with 2SES than OLS
(Wooldridge, 2003), and this can be illustrated using Eqs. (13) and (14). INST are
predicted (fitted) values obtained from Eq. (13) that is essentially a linear combination o f
all six exogenous variables (SIZE, DEBT, FIX, ROA, BETA and DIV). That is, the
variations in INST can be perfectly explained by the six exogenous variables. IN ST ,
acting as a 2SLS estimator in place o f INST, will be possibly correlated with SIZE,
DEBT, and FIX in Eq. (14) because INST are predicted (fitted) values from Eq. (13).
Thus, serious multicollinearity in Eq. (14) may exist. However, there is no guideline for
how multicollinearity in a 2 SES regression model can be detected. No statistics such as
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variance inflation factors (VIF), condition index or Pearson correlation matrix are
available under the 2SLS function in SPSS.

Sample and Data
For this study, the sample consists o f firms from the three major hospitality
sectors— restaurant, casino and hotel. All sample firms were firstly identified with their
primary North American Industry Classification System (NAICS) code numbers.
Specifically, the restaurant sector includes firms under NAICS code number 722110 (i.e..
Full-service restaurants) or 722211 (i.e., Limited-service restaurants); the casino sector
covers firms under NAICS code number 713210 (i.e.. Casinos) or 721120 (i.e.. Casino
Hotels); and the hotel sector includes firms with NAICS code number 721110 (Hotels &
Motels). Secondly, the identified firms whose institutional investors’ investment portfolio
meeting the SEC’s Form 13F reporting requirements (i.e., portfolio fair market value
equal to or over $100 million) between 1999-2003 were targeted and pooled. The sample
was then narrowed depending upon accounting and financial information and institutional
ownership data availability from the data sources.
The choice o f period 1999-2003 for this dissertation was based on two considerations.
Firstly, there are not as many publicly traded firms in the hospitality industry as in other
manufacturing industries. The number o f firm observations in one single year m ay not be
able to produce any meaningful or valid results when employing statistical techniques
such as linear regression. Pooled data o f more than one year were thus used for the
empirical investigation in this study. Secondly, a preliminary data screening shows that
institutional ownership information for hospitality firms before 1999 was relatively
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limited. Therefore, a pooled sample o f hospitality firms in time period o f five years
between 1999-2003 was adopted.
The accounting and financial information o f those firms for 1999-2003 was obtained
from Standard & Poor’s COMPUSTAT, Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP),
and institutional ownership information for the same period was gathered from Thomson
Financial. Accounting information that was collected is based upon the variables included
in the proposed model. A list o f accounting and financial variables collected from
Standard & Poor’s COMPUSTAT database is shown in Table 3.
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Table 3 Variables Collected from S&P’s COMPUSTAT between 1999-2003
Variable

Description

Acronym

DATA 6

Total Assets (MM$)

CST 6

DATA9

Long-term Debt (MM$)

CST9

DATAI 2

Net Sales (MM$)

CST12

Income before Extraordinary Items
DATA20

Adjusted for Common Stock

CST20

Equivalents (MM$)
DATA 2 1

Common Dividends (MM$)

CST21

DATA24

Year-end Stock Close Price ($&C)

CST24

DATA25

Common shares Outstanding (MM)

CST25

Capital Expenditures on Property,
DATA30

CST30
Plant & Equipment (MM$)

DATA34

Debt in Current Liabilities (MM$)

CST34

DATA60

Total Common Equity (MM$)

CST60

Deferred Taxes on Balance Sheet
DATA74

CST74
(MM$)

DATA 172

Net Income (MM$)

CST172

Note: MM is millions; MM$ is millions o f dollars; $&C is dollars and cents.
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Table 4 shows computation o f the variables included in the proposed model [i.e., Eqs.
(1) and (2)] using COMPUSTAT data collected for this dissertation. Year-end BETA
values o f the sample firms were collected from CRSP.

Table 4 Computation o f the Variables in the Proposed Model
Variable
Proxy Q
SIZE
DEBT

FIX

ROA

DIV

COMPUSTAT data used in computation
(CST6 + (CST24 x CST25) - (CST60 + CST74))
CST6
log(CST6)
(CST9 + CST34)
CST6
(CST30)
(CST12)

Eq. (1)

Eq. (2)

V

V

V

V

V

V

V

(CST172)
(CST6)
(CST21)
(CST20)

V

V

Institutional ownership data collected includes manager name (mgmame), manager
number (mgmo), report date (rdate), CUSIP, shares held at report date (shares), stock
name (stkname), ticker symbol (ticker), shares outstanding in 1000s at the end o f quarter
(shrout2), and share price at the end o f quarter (prc). For each hospitality firm, the
institutional ownership percentage at the end o f each year from 1999-2003 (if available)
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was calculated by dividing the number o f shares held by institutional investors by the
number o f shares outstanding at the end o f the fourth quarter.

Summary
A proposed simultaneous equations model investigating the institutional
ownership/firm performance relationship in the hospitality industry was presented with
justifications on variable selection and on possible statistical technique adoption in this
chapter. After data colleetion on the identified sample firms, the statistical techniques that
were discussed in this chapter can be deployed and results will be presented in the next
chapter.
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CHAPTER 4

FINDINGS OF THE STUDY
The first section o f this chapter provides the descriptive statistics o f all variables used
in this dissertation; further, a pair-wise correlation matrix is presented. The second
section presents relevant data analysis results, including the DWH test and regression
analyses for the three hospitality sectors as described in Chapter Three. The three
hypotheses o f this dissertation will then be tested and the underlying assumptions of
relevant regression analysis will be checked in the last section.

Descriptive Statistics
The Restaurant Sector
Ninety-nine restaurant firms were first identified hy their individual NAICS code
number (i.e., 722110 & 722211). Firms with insufficient accounting and financial data
needed for this study and/or lacking institutional ownership information between
1999-2003 were excluded. Five years (1999-2003) o f data were pooled for a total o f 284
firm/year observations from 65 restaurant firms, including 50 full-service restaurant firms
(NAICS code 722110) and 15 limited-service ones (NAICS code 722211). Sample
descriptive statistics o f the variables are presented in Table 5.
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Table 5 Descriptive Statistics for the Restaurant Sector
Max

Min

0.767

4.531

0.470

0.412

0318

1.255

0.000

284

8.249

0.741

10.407

6372

DEBT

284

0.275

0309

1.000

0.000

FIX

284

0.108

0.251

4.167

0.005

ROA

284

0.032

0.094

0.227

-0.573

BETA

284

0366

0389

1.546

-0.785

DIV

284

0.036

0.110

0.907

0.000

Variable

N

Mean

Std. Dev.

Ô

284

1.517

INST

284

SIZE

Proxy Q ranges from 0.470 to 4.531, with a mean o f 1.517. Two hundred and ten out
o f the 284 firm/year observations, or 73.9% o f the pooled restaurant sample, had a proxy
Q of larger than one (see Figure 2). From an individual firm perspective, 53 out o f the 65

restaurant firms, or 81.5%, had an average proxy Q o f larger than one (see Figure 3).
When a firm is worth more than its value based on what it would cost to rebuild it, or
when Tobin’s Q is larger than one, excess profits are being earned, and these profits are
above and beyond the level that is necessary to keep the firm in the industry (Lindenberg
& Ross, 1981). In other words, the majority o f the restaurant firms in the sample have
performed relatively well as measured by their larger than one proxy g s during
1999-2003.
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Figure 2. Histogram o f Proxy g for the Restaurant Sector (Firm/Year)

The average percentage o f institutional ownership (INST) is 41.2%, with a maximum
o f 125.5% and a minimum o f 0.006%. In the case o f short sales by institutional investors
where some o f the firm shares are owned by more than one party, it is possible that
institutional ownership exceeds 100% o f the firm (Asquith, Pathak & Ritter, 2005). One
hundred and sixty-two out o f the 284 firm/observations, or 57.0% o f the pooled
restaurant sample, had less than 50% institutional ownership during 1999-2003 (see
Figure 4). From an individual firm perspective, 39 out o f the 65 restaurant firms had an
average o f less than 50% institutional ownership during 1999-2003 (see Figure 5).
Another notable characteristic is the 27.5% mean deht ratio. This implies that the
restaurant firms rely less on debt financing and more on equity capital. Two hundred and
fifty out o f the 284 restaurant firm/year observations had a debt ratio o f less than 50%
(see Figure 6). From an individual firm perspective, fifty-eight, or almost 90%, o f the 65
restaurant firms had an average debt ratio o f less than 50% (see Figure 7).
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Figure 3. Histogram o f Proxy Q for the Restaurant Sector (Firm Average)

Institutional Ownership (1.00 = 100%)

Figure 4. Histogram o f Institutional Ownership for the Restaurant Sector (Firm/Year)
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Figure 5. Histogram o f Institutional Ownership for the Restaurant Sector (Firm Average)

Debt Ratio

Figure 6. Histogram o f Debt Ratio for the Restaurant Sector (Firm/Year)
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Debt Ratio

Figure 7. Histogram o f Debt Ratio for the Restaurant Sector (Firm Average)

The Casino Sector
Fifty-three casino firms were initially identified hy their individual NAICS code
number (i.e., 721120 & 713210). Firms with insufficient accounting and financial data
and/or lacking institutional ownership information between 1999-2003 were eliminated.
Five years (1999-2003) o f data were pooled for a total o f 106 firm/year observations from
24 casino firms, including 18 casino hotel firms (NAICS code 721120) and six casino
firms (NAICS code 713210). Sample descriptive statistics for the variables are presented
in Table 6.
Proxy Q ranges from 0.414 to 3.086, with a mean o f 1.139. Sixty-nine out o f the 106
firm/year observations, or 65.1% o f the pooled casino sample, had a proxy Q o f larger
than one (see Figure 8). From an individual firm perspective, 17 out o f the 24 casino
firms, or 70.8% o f the firms, had an average proxy Q o f larger than one (see Figure 9). As
with the restaurant sector, the majority o f the casino firms in the sample seem to have
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performed relatively well as measured by their larger than one proxy Qs during
1999-2003.

Table 6 Descriptive Statistics for the Casino Sector
Variable

N

Mean

Std. Dev.

Max

Min

Ô

106

1.139

0.435

3.086

0.414

INST

106

0.466

0378

0.872

OTWl

SIZE

106

&996

0.741

10.111

7.391

DEBT

106

0326

0.221

1.000

0.000

FIX

106

4.516

39.914

407.65

0.004

ROA

106

0.019

0.044

0.157

-0.105

BETA

106

0399

0.545

1.930

-0.678

DIV

106

0.041

0307

E638

0.000

The average percentage o f institutional ownership (INST) is 46.6%, with a maximum
o f 87.2% and a minimum o f 0.1%. Fifty-seven out o f the 106 firm/year observations, or
53.8% o f the pooled casino sample, had less than 50% institutional ownership during
1999-2003 (see Figure 10). From an individual firm perspective, 13 out o f the 24 casino
firms had an average o f less than 50% institutional ownership during 1999-2003 (see
Figure 11).
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Proxy Q

Figure 8. Flistogram o f Proxy Q for the Casino Sector (Firm/Year)

Another noteworthy characteristic is the 52.6% mean deht ratio in the casino sample.
It shows that the casino firms in this study, on average, rely slightly more on debt
financing than on equity capital. Sixty-two out o f the 106 casino firm/year observations
had a debt ratio o f more than 50% (see Figure 12). Alternatively from an individual firm
perspective, 13, or 54.2%, o f the casino firms had an average deht ratio o f more than 50%
(see Figure 13).
The mean for FIX is 451.6%. This was due to the inclusion o f the Wynn Resorts
(NASDAQ: WYNN) which opened in late April 2005. The Wynn Resorts provided two
firm/year observations (2002 & 2003) and its inclusion did not affect the results o f this
dissertation significantly during preliminary data analysis; therefore, their data were not
excluded from the study. The mean FIX reduces to 13.6% with a standard deviation o f
20.7% if the Wynn data were excluded.
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Figure 9. Histogram o f Proxy Q for the Casino Sector (Firm Average)
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Figure 10. Histogram o f Institutional Ownership for the Casino Sector (Firm/Year)
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Figure 11. Histogram o f Institutional Ownership for the Casino Sector (Firm Average)
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Figure 12. Histogram o f Debt Ratio for the Casino Sector (Firm/Year)
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Figure 13. Histogram o f Debt Ratio for the Casino Sector (Firm Average)

The Hotel Sector
Tiventy-eight hotel firms were originally targeted by their individual NAICS code
(721110). Firms with insufficient accounting and financial data and/or lacking
institutional ownership information between 1999-2003 were excluded. Five years
(1999-2003) o f data were pooled for a total o f 75 firm/year observations from 19 hotel
firms. Sample descriptive statistics for the variables are presented in Table 7.
Proxy Q ranges from 0.625 to 3.659, with a mean o f 1.121. Forty-one out o f the 75
firm/year observations, or 54.7% o f the pooled hotel sample, had a proxy Q o f larger than
one (see Figure 14). From an individual firm perspective, only nine out o f the 19 casino
firms, or 47.4% o f the firms, had an average proxy Q o f larger than one (see Figure 15).
Different from the restaurant and casino sectors, only about half o f the hotel firms in the
sample performed well during the time frame o f this study as measured by their larger
than one proxy Qs during 1999-2003.
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The average percentage o f institutional ownership (INST) is 43.9%, with a maximum
o f 94.1% and a minimum o f 5.8%. Forty-eight out o f the 75 firm/year observations, or
64% o f the pooled hotel sample, had less than 50% institutional ownership during
1999-2003 (see Figure 16). From an individual firm perspective, 12 out o f the 19 hotel
firms had an average o f less than 50% institutional ownership during 1999-2003 (see
Figure 17).

Table 7 Descriptive Statistics for the Hotel Sector
Variable

N

Mean

Std. Dev.

Max

Min

Q

75

1.121

0.568

3.659

0.625

INST

75

0.439

0.215

0.941

0.058

SIZE

75

9.013

0.542

10.073

7.992

DEBT

75

0.419

0.211

0.950

0.102

FIX

75

0.185

0356

1.872

0.000

ROA

75

0.012

(1081

0.491

-0.199

BETA

75

0.713

0.504

2369

-0T88

DIV

75

0376

1.269

10.310

0.000

The 41.9% mean debt ratio in the hotel sample shows that the hotel firms in this study,
on average, rely less on debt financing than on equity capital. Twenty out o f the 75 hotel
firm/year observations had a debt ratio o f less than 50% (see Figure 18). Alternatively, 14,
or 73.7%, o f the hotel firms had an average debt ratio o f less than 50% (see Figure 19).
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Figure 14. Histogram o f Proxy Q for the Hotel Sector (Firm/Year)

.75

1.00

1.25

1.50

1.75

2.00

2.25

2.50

Proxy Q

Figure 15. Histogram o f Proxy Q for the Hotel Sector (Firm Average)
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Figure 16. Histogram o f Institutional Ownership for the Hotel Sector (Firm/Year)
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Figure 17. Histogram o f Institutional Ownership for the Hotel Sector (Firm Average)
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Figure 18. Histogram o f Debt Ratio for the Hotel Sector (Firm/Year)
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Figure 19. Histogram o f Debt Ratio for the Hotel Sector (Firm Average)
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Correlation Matrix
Table 8 shows the correlation matrix o f the variables used in the restaurant sector.
The 0.602 correlation coefficient between INST and proxy Q suggests a possible
relationship between the two from either direction. The 0.661 correlation coefficient
between INST and SIZE implies that firm size may be an important factor in determining
institutional ownership. The remaining correlation coefficients indicate moderate to low
inter-correlation among the other variables.
Table 9 shows the correlation matrix o f the variables used in the casino sector. The
low 0.101 correlation coefficient between INST and proxy Q does not show a likely
relationship between the two. Again, the 0.606 correlation coefficient between INST and
SIZE indicates that firm size may play an important role in determining institutional
ownership. The remaining correlation coefficients, except those between SIZE and BETA,
indicate moderate to low inter-correlation among the other variables.

Table 8 Correlation Matrix o f the Variables Used in the Restaurant Sector
INST
INST

Proxy Q

SIZE

DEBT

FIX

ROA

DIV

BETA

1

Proxy Q

0.602**

1

SIZE

0.661**

0.333**

1

DEBT

-0.305**

-0.254**

0.087

1

-0.099

-0.094

FIX

0.036

0.271**

ROA

0.442**

0.337**

DIV

0.067

BETA

0.373**

-0.081
0.303**

1

0.312**

-0.160**

-0.084

1

0.302**

-0.115

-0.046

0.099

0.495**

-0.025

0.087

0.168**

1
0.112

Note: ** represents the 0.01 significance level.
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1

Table 9 Correlation Matrix o f the Variables Used in the Casino Sector
INST
INST

Proxy Q

SIZE

DEBT

FIX

ROA

DIV

BETA

1

Proxy Q

0.101

SIZE

0.606**

1
0.062

1

DEBT

-0.053

0.348**

0.222*

FIX

-0.022

0.134

0.035

ROA

0.110

0.339**

DIV

0.272**

0.023

0.300**

BETA

0.451**

0.100

0.609**

-0.117

1
-0.086

1

-0.318**

-0.118

1

-0.072

-0.024

0.009

0.093

-0.055

0.201*

1
0.280**

1

Note: ** and * represent the 0.01 and 0.05 significance levels, respectively.

Table 10 Correlation Matrix of the Variables Used in the Hotel Sector
INST
INST

Proxy Q

SIZE

DEBT

FIX

ROA

DIV

1

Proxy Q

0.253*

SIZE

0.340**

DEBT

-0.332**

-0.309**

-0.213

1

FIX

-0.266*

-0.216

-0.069

-0.026

ROA

0.203

0.066

-0.252*

-0.024

1

DIV

-0.207

0.233*

-0.172

0.073

0.036

1

-0.099

0.081

-0.072

BETA

BETA

0.377**

1
0.146

0.321**
-0.012
0.263*

I

0.572**

0.251*

1

1

Note: ** and * represent the 0.01 and 0.05 significance levels, respectively.

Table 10 shows the correlation matrix o f the variables used in the hotel sector. The
low 0.253 correlation coefficient between Proxy Q and INST does not indicate a strong
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relationship between the two from either direction. The remaining correlation coefficients
indicate moderate to low inter-correlation among the other variables.

Results o f the Durbin-Wu-Hausman Test
As aforementioned, in a system containing interdependent endogenous variables, the
2SLS technique is preferred over OLS as the latter may result in biased and inconsistent
parameter estimates (Wooldridge, 2003). The DWH test on INST in the firm performance
equation [i.e., Eq. (1)] and on proxy Q in the institutional ownership equation [i.e., Eq.
(2)], respectively, was performed in the restaurant, casino and hotel sectors to justify the
need and the adoption o f 2SLS in either Eq. (1) or Eq. (2), or both.
As shown in Table 11, the DWH test results show that the coefficient o f INST res in
the restaurant sector is significantly different from zero (t = -3.644,p = 0.000) at the 0.01
significance level. The results not only echo previous research treating ownership
structure (e.g., managerial ownership, institutional ownership and hlockholder ownership)
as an endogenous variable when modeling its relationship with firm performance
(Agrawal & Knoeber, 1996; Cho, 1998; Demsetz & Lehn, 1985; Demsetz & Villalonga,
2001; Holdemess et al., 1999; Loderer & Martin, 1997; McConnell & Servaes, 1990) but
also justify the need for 2SLS in Eq. (1) and inclusion o f the endogenous institutional
ownership variable in a simultaneous equations system in the restaurant sector. On the
other hand, the DWH test results in Table 12 show that the coefficient o f g res is not
significantly different from zero (t = 0.007,/? = 0.995). This suggests that applying OLS
in Eq. (2) for the restaurant sector is sufficient to produce consistent and unbiased
regression coefficients.
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Table 11 Results o f the DWH Test for Endogeneity o f ESfST for the Restaurant Sector
Dependent Variable

t statistics

p value

(Intercept)

4.409

0.000

INST

6.958

0.000

SIZE

-3.448

0.001

Q

Independent Variable

DEBT

0.035

FIX
INST res

4.346

0.000

-3.644

0.000

Table 12 Results o f the DWH Test for Endogeneity o f Proxy Q for the Restaurant Sector
Dependent Variable

INST

t statistics

p value

Independent Variable
(Intercept)

-12.166

0.000

2323

0.021

SIZE

10.951

0.000

ROA

3.025

0.003

BETA

-0.613

0.541

DEBT

-5.910

0.000

DIV

-2 9 6 7

0.003

gres

0.007

0.995

Ô
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As shown in Table 13, the DWH test results show that the coefficient o f INST res in
the casino sector is significantly different from zero (t - -4.681,/? = 0.000) at the 0.01
significance level. Again the endogeneity o f institutional ownership is evidenced and the
application o f 2SLS in Eq. (1) is justified in the casino sector. The DWH test results in
Table 14 show that the coefficient o f g res is not significantly different from zero (t =
0.690, p = 0.492). This indicates that applying OLS in Eq. (2) for the casino sector is
sufficient to produce consistent and unbiased regression coefficients.

Table 13 Results o f the DWH Test for Endogeneity o f INST for the Casino Sector
t statistics

p value

(Intercept)

5.425

0.000

INST

5.057

0.000

SIZE

-4.960

0.000

DEBT

&673

0.000

FIX

3.6II

0.000

-4.681

0.000

Dependent Variable

Q

Independent Variable

INST_res
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Table 14 Results o f the DWH Test for Endogeneity o f Proxy Q for the Casino Sector
t statistics

/? value

(Intercept)

-4.053

0.000

Ô

-0.342

0.733

SIZE

5.682

0.000

ROA

1.074

fr286

BETA

1.431

0.156

DEBT

-0.601

0.549

DIV

0.721

0.473

Q res

(1690

0.492

Dependent Variable

INST

Independent Variable

As shown in Table 15, the DW H test results show that the coefficient o f INST res in
the hotel sector is not significantly different from zero (t = -1.393,/? = 0.168). Different
from the evidence o f the endogeneity o f institutional ownership shown in the restaurant
and casino sectors, institutional ownership in the hotel sector is deemed exogenous and is
not determined inside o f the proposed simultaneous equations system. Therefore, the
application o f 2SLS in Eq. (I) is not justified, and applying OLS in Eq. (I) is sufficient.
The DWH test results in Table 16 show that the coefficient o f g res is significantly
different from zero (t = -2.146,/? = 0.036) at the 0.05 significance level. This suggests
that proxy Q acts as an endogenous explanatory variable in Eq. (2) and applying 2SLS in
Eq. (2) for the hotel sector is justified.
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Table 15 Results of the DWH Test for Endogeneity o f INST for the Hotel Sector
Dependent Variable

t statistics

p value

(Intercept)

I.2I3

0.229

INST

L583

0.II8

SIZE

-0.478

0.634

DEBT

-1.087

I128I

FIX

-0.651

0.518

INST res

-E393

0.168

Q

Independent Variable

Table 16 Results o f the DWH Test for Endogeneity o f Proxy Q for the Hotel Sector
Dependent Variable

INST

t statistics

p value

-2.098

0.040

Ô

2236

0.029

SIZE

2.409

0.019

ROA

-I.0I8

0.312

BETA

-0.659

0.512

DEBT

41258

0.797

DIV

-2.551

0.013

gres

-2.146

0.036

Independent Variable
(Intercept)
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In summary, in both the restaurant and casino sectors, applying the 2SLS technique in
Eq. (1) is justified and the endogeneity o f institutional ownership is evidenced, while
OLS application is sufficient in Eq. (2) where proxy Q acts as an exogenous explanatory
variable. In the hotel sector, opposite to the two other sectors and to some previous
empirical studies, institutional ownership is found to be exogenous, and, therefore, OLS
application is sufficient in Eq. (1). While proxy Q is found to be an endogenous
explanatory variable in Eq. (2), 2SLS is preferred over OLS.

Regression Results
The OLS and 2SLS functions in SPSS software were applied in estimating Eqs. (1)
and (2) in the simultaneous equations model. Although only one o f the two techniques is
suitable for testing the firm performance equation [i.e., Eqs. (1)] or the institutional
ownership equation [i.e., Eq. (2)] in this study depending upon the DWH tests performed
in the previous section, both the OLS and 2SLS regression results o f Eqs. (1) and (2) for
the restaurant, casino and hotel sectors are presented and interpreted in this section.
Firm Performance Equation: The Restaurant Sector
Both the OLS and 2SLS results for Eq. (1) are presented in Table 17. For the OLS
results, most remarkably, restaurant firm performance as measured by proxy Q is
statistically dependent on the percentage o f institutional ownership (t = 9.246, p = 0.000)
at the 0.01 significance level. This finding is consistent with previous research where
institutional ownership was treated as an exogenous variable (Chaganti & Damanpour,
1991; Han & Suck, 1998; McConnell & Servaes, 1990). In other words, a higher
percentage o f institutional ownership contributes to better restaurant firm performance.
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Table 17 Regression Results o f the Performanee Equation for the Restaurant Sector
Dependent Variable: Firm Performance (Proxy Q)
OLS

t statistics

/? value

3.887

0.000

2.309

6.134

0.000

0.061

2.108

-3.040

0.003

0.391

0.696

1.288

L872 '

0LI62

4.884

0.000

1.029

3.832

0.000

45.506

0.000

36200

0.000

t statistics

/? value

(Intercept)

3.578

0.000

INST

9.246

0.000

SIZE

-1.880

DEBT
FIX

F statistics

Adjusted

2SLS
VIF

0.385

0.332

Treating institutional ownership endogenously as justified by the DWH test, the 2SLS
results indicate that institutional ownership (INST) is still a significant determinant o f
restaurant firm performance (t = 6.134,/? = 0.000) at the 0.01 significance level. While
this finding is inconsistent with certain previous research that failed to establish a positive
and significant relationship between institutional ownership and firm performanee in a
simultaneous framework (Agrawal & Knoeber, 1996; Craswell et al., 1997; Loderer &
Martin, 1997), it confirms Clay’s (2001) empirical conclusion that institutional ownership
inereases firm value, as measured by a proxy for Tobin’s Q. It is possible that when
finaneial institutions acquire a block o f financial interest in restaurant firms, they assume
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an efficient monitoring role in the firms in order to fulfill their fiduciary duty; hence, this
may result in better restaurant firm performance.
SIZE was included as a control variable and was found to be a significant determinant
o f restaurant firm performance for both the OLS (t = -1.880,/? = 0.061) result at the 0.1
significance level and the 2SLS (t = -3.040,/? = 0.003) result at the 0.05 significance level.
The negative sign suggests that larger restaurant firms tend to be associated with lower
proxy Q. This finding is consistent with what was expected— that both growth
opportunities and Tobin’s Q should be lower for larger firms (Agrawal & Knoeber, 1996).
This was also evidenced in the restaurant sector in this study.
DEBT was found to be a significant and positive determinant o f restaurant firm
performance in 2SLS (t = 1.872,/? = 0.062) at the 0.1 significance level but not in OLS.
Although restaurant firms are considered less debt dependent with an average debt ratio
o f 27.5% as shown in Table 5, DEBT serves to capture a value-enhaneing effect possibly
through corporate tax shields that result in higher values o f performanee indicators— in
this study proxy Q (Morck et al., 1988). Furthermore, while proxy Q reflects how the
market prices the firm to some extent (the numerator o f proxy Q calculation contains the
market value o f common equity o f the firm), the positive impact o f DEBT on proxy Q in
the restaurant sector indicates that the market may encourage restaurant firms to utilize
more o f their debt capacity or increase their debt leverage.
FIX exhibits a positive impact on restaurant firm performance in both the OLS (t =
4.884,/? = 0.000) and 2SLS results (t = 3.832,/? = 0.000) at the 0.01 significance level. A
possible aecounting distortion (e.g., different depreciation methods) o f restaurant firm
performance measured by proxy Q m ay have existed in restaurant firms over the period
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involved in this study. Although the average FIX o f 10.8% in the sample firms is
relatively low compared to that o f 49.6% in Demsetz & Villalonga’s (2001) study, the
results echo their findings that FIX has a significant and positive impact on average
Tobin’s Q.
The adjusted R-squared for Eq. (1) is 0.385 for OLS and 0.332 for 2SLS. In other
words, the OLS model explains 38.5% o f the variations o f proxy Q where institutional
ownership was treated as an exogenous variable, and the 2SLS model accounted for
33.2% o f the variations o f proxy Q where institutional ownership was treated
endogenously. This study’s adjusted R-squared figures derived from the model in the
restaurant seetor are higher than those o f previous studies. For example, Agrawal &
Knoeber (1996) had a 0.35 adjusted R-squared for the OLS model and 0.05 for the 2SLS
one, and Clay (2001) had a 0.33 adjusted R-square for the OLS model and 0.15 for the
2SLS one. The F statistics for Eq. (1) are 45.506 (p = 0.000) for OLS and 36.200 (p =
0.000) for 2SLS, indicating that both the models are statistically significant at the 0.01
significanee level in explaining the variations in restaurant firm performance as measured
by proxy Q.
Serious multicollinearity is likely not present in OLS, sinee all VIFs o f the
independent variables are below 10 (Neter et al., 1996). For the 2SLS technique, the level
o f multicollinearity among the independent variables could not be assessed because VIFs,
Pearson correlation matrix or condition index is not available in the 2SLS regression
output. Although the coeffieient estimates in the presence of multieollinearity remain
unbiased and the R-squared is unaffected, the issue o f multicollinearity may cause large
varianees o f the coefficient estimates that attribute Type II errors. One rule o f thumb in
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dealing with the multicollinearity issue is that, as long as all t statistics are larger than 2
when adopting the 0.05 signifieance level or larger than 1.67 when adopting the 0.1
significance level, the issue is not o f concern (Kennedy, 2003). In other words, when key
t statistics are large enough to reject the null hypothesis in a t-test at the 0.1 significance
level adopted in this study, the effect o f multicollinearity on the model becomes
irrelevant (Jeffrey M. Wooldridge, personal communication, April 5, 2005). In view of
the t statistics o f the 2SLS results in Table 17, possible existence o f serious
multicollinearity effects in this study appear to be minimal.
While the 2SLS technique is justified and preferred in Eq. (1) in the restaurant sector,
the OLS and 2SLS techniques yield relatively similar results on the t tests o f the set of
independent variables with the exeeption o f the DEBT variable.
Institutional Ownership Equation: The Restaurant Sector
Table 18 presents regression results o f the institutional ownership equation for the
restaurant sector. Proxy Q was found to be a significant determinant o f the percentage o f
institutional ownership in restaurant firms for both the OLS (t = 7.129,/? = 0.000) and
2SLS (t = 2.327,/? = 0.021) results at the 0.05 signifieance level. In other words,
institutional investors are attracted to restaurant firms with better performance, as
measured by proxy Q. Better performing restaurant firms may help satisfy institutional
investors’ fiduciary duties to their clients and attract higher institutional shareholdings.
This finding is consistent with C ho’s (1998), Loderer & M artin’s (1997) and Demsetz &
Villalonga’s (2001) studies, in whieh ownership structure is treated endogenously.
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Table 18
Regression Results o f the Institutional Ownership Equation for the Restaurant Sector
Dependent Variable: Institutional Ownership Percentage
2SLS

OLS
t statistics

/? value

VIF

t statistics

/? value

-12.188

0.000

-12.635

0.000

7.129

0.000

1.423

2.327

0.021

SIZE

13.831

0.000

1.731

10.971

0.000

ROA

3.577

0.000

1.212

3.303

0.003

BETA

-0.670

0.504

1.367

-0.614

0.540

DEBT

-7.790

0.000

1.185

-5.920

0.000

DIV

<3.695

0.000

1.209

-2.973

0.003

104.949

0.000

9 2 380

0.000

(Intercept)

Q

F statistics

Adjusted

0.671

(X688

SIZE was found to affect the level o f institutional ownership in restaurant firms in a
positive and significant manner for both the OLS (t = 13.381,/? = 0.000) and 2SLS (t =
10.971,/? = 0.000) results at the 0.01 significance level. Although larger firms require
more investment capital from shareholders for a given fraction o f equity o f the firm,
institutions seem to have a preference for larger restaurant firms, which may be due to
their higher financial capability than smaller firms. This finding is consistent with what
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was expected— that financial institutions are more likely to buy stocks o f large firms
(Crutchley et ah, 1999). This was also evidenced in the restaurant sector in this study.
Consistent with O ’Brien and Bhushan’s (1990), and Crutchley et al.’s (1999) studies,
the profitability o f restaurant firms in this study (measured by ROA) was found to be a
significant and positive determinant o f institutional ownership percentage for both the
OLS (t = 3.577,/? = 0.000) and 2SLS (t = 3.303,/? = 0.003) results at the 0.01
significance level. This result also supports the notion that financial institutions invest in
firms with higher profitability to fulfill their fiduciary responsibility to investors
(Crutchley et ah, 1999).
In a finding that is inconsistent with the research o f O ’Brien and Bhushan (1990) and
Crutchley et al. (1999), BETA, or the systematic risk o f the restaurant firms in this study,
does not have a significant relationship with the changes in institutional ownership
percentage for either the OLS or 2SLS results. One possible explanation for the lack of
significance for the BETA variable in this study is that the stocks o f restaurant firms may
not be risky, as evidenced by the average BETA o f 0.366 (see Table 5) for the sample
firms, where only 20 out o f the 284 restaurant firm/year observations had a BETA greater
than one. Typical stocks have a BETA equal to or greater than one (Keown et al., 2003).
The average value o f BETA in Crutchley et al.’s (1999) study was 1.064 for the 1987
sample and 1.072 for the 1993 sample. BETA in their study acts as a significant
determinant o f institutional ownership percentage for both years that were examined. In
other words, finaneial institutions may not consider risk in terms o f BETA as a
significant factor when making buy/sell decisions on restaurant stocks, since the overall
industry has a low systematic risk level.
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DEBT has a significant and negative impact on institutional ownership in restaurant
firms for both the OLS (t = -7.790,/? = 0.000 and 2SLS (t = -5.920,/? = 0.000) results at
the 0.01 significance level. Thus, higher debt ratios lead to lower institutional ownership
percentages. This finding is consistent with the notion that higher debt ratios lessen the
need for institutional monitoring and result in lower shareholdings by institutions
(Demsetz & Villalonga, 2001; Welch, 2003). This result also supports Bathala et al.’s
(1994), Chaganti & Damanpour’s (1991) and Crutchley & Jensen’s (1996) empirical
findings that debt and institutional ownership have become substitutes for each other in
the agency framework. In other words, restaurants with lower debt levels may allow
institutions to have greater freedom in their monitoring role, thus creating an incentive for
them to own more shares. In addition, institutions may prefer low-debt firms possibly due
to their fear o f high bankruptcy rates in restaurant firms (Gu, 2002).
DIV shows a significant and negative impact on institutional ownership in restaurant
firms for both the OLS (t = -3.695,/? = 0.000) and 2SLS (t = -2.973,/? = 0.003) results at
the 0.01 significance level. The negative sign on DIV further suggests that institutions
may prefer restaurant firms that retain their earnings for future reinvestment purposes.
This finding supports what Jensen, Solberg & Z om ’s (1992) point that financial
institutions investing in firms are not attracted by any specific dividend policy.
The adjusted R-squared o f Eq. (2) is 0.688 for OLS and 0.671 for 2SLS. Thus, the
OLS model explained 68.8% o f the variations in the institutional ownership data where it
was treated exogenously, and the 2SLS model accounted for 67.1% o f the variations in
the institutional ownership data where it was treated endogenously. As with Eq. (1), the
adjusted R-squared figures o f Eq. (2) derived from this study are much higher than those
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o f previous studies. Agrawal & Knoeber (1996) had a 0.13 adjusted R-squared for the
2SLS model (no OLS model was examined on the institutional ownership in their study),
and Clay (2001) had a 0.49 adjusted R-squared for the OLS model (no 2SLS model was
examined on the institutional ownership in his study). In this study, the model F statistics
for Eq. (2) are 104.949 {p = 0.000) for OLS and 97.380 {p = 0.000) for 2SLS, signifying
that both models are statistically significant in explaining the variations in institutional
ownership as measured by their ownership percentage at the 0.01 significance level.
Serious multicollinearity does not appear to be present in the OLS model, since all
VIFs are below 10 (Neter et al., 1996). Concerns o f serious multicollinearity among the
independent variables in 2SLS do not seem to be present either, since OLS application is
sufficient in Eq. (2). While OLS is sufficient in Eq. (2) for the restaurant sector, both the
OLS and 2SLS techniques provide identical results on the t-tests for the set of
independent variables (e.g., SIZE is significant in both the OLS and 2SLS results).
Firm Performance Equation: The Casino Sector
Table 19 shows both the OLS and 2SLS results o f Eq. (1) for the casino sector. For
the OLS results, institutional ownership demonstrates a significant and positive impact (t
= 1.970,/? = 0.051), at the 0.1 significance level, on casino firm performance as measured
by proxy Q. This finding is not only consistent with previous research where institutional
ownership was treated as an exogenous variable (Chaganti & Damanpour, 1991; Han &
Suck, 1998; McConnell & Servaes, 1990), but also with what was found in the restaurant
sector in this study. Thus, a higher percentage o f institutional ownership leads to better
casino firm performance.
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Table 19 Regression Results o f the Performance Equation for the Casino Sector
Dependent Variable: Firm Performance (Proxy Q)
2SLS

OLS

t statistics

p value

2.344

0.021

1.804

2.185

0.031

0.119

1.955

-2.143

0.035

4.282

0.000

1.150

2h883

0.005

FIX

1.994

0.049

1.016

1.560

0.122

F statistics

5.566

0.000

2.227

0.071

Adjusted

0.144

t statistics

p value

(Intercept)

2.784

0.006

INST

1.970

0.051

SIZE

-1.572

DEBT

VIF

0.045

Considering institutional ownership as an endogenous explanatory variable, as
justified by the DWH test, the 2SLS results show that institutional ownership is still a
significant determinant o f casino firm performance (t = 2.185,/? = 0.031) at the 0.05
significance level. This finding is, again, inconsistent with previous research that failed to
establish a positive and significant relationship between institutional ownership and firm
performance in a simultaneous Ifamework (Agrawal & Knoeber, 1996; Craswell et ah,
1997; Loderer & Martin, 1997). However, it confirms Clay’s (2001) empirical conclusion
that institutional ownership increases firm value as measured by a proxy for Tobin’s Q,
as was found for the restaurant sector in this study. Institutional investors may have
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assumed an efficient monitoring role in eorporate governance in casino firms, despite the
possible hindrance o f ownership restrietions set forth in state gaming regulations, in order
to fulfill their fiduciary duties. This contributes to better casino firm performance.
SIZE, acting as a control variable, was found to be a significant determinant o f casino
firm performance for the 2SLS results (t = -2.143,/? = 0.035) at the 0.05 significanee
level but not for the OLS ones. The negative sign indicates that larger casino firms are
associated with lower proxy Qs. The expectation that both growth opportunities and
Tobin’s Q should be lower for larger firms (Agrawal & Knoeber, 1996) was also
evidenced in the casino sector in this study
DEBT was found to be a significant and positive determinant o f casino firm
performance in both the 2SLS (t = 4.282,/? = 0.000) and OLS (t = 2.883,/? = 0.005)
results at the 0.01 significance level. Although the casino sector, characterized by a
52.6% mean debt ratio in the sample as shown in Table 6, on average relies slightly more
on debt than equity eapital, DEBT attributes a value-enhancing effect possibly via
corporate tax shields that bring about higher values o f performance indicators— in this
study proxy Q (Morck et al., 1988). In addition, since proxy Q somewhat reflects how the
market prices the firm, the positive impact o f DEBT on proxy Q indicates the market may
encourage more debt usage o f casino firms for future development purposes possibly due
to the seetor’s prospective outlook.
FIX reveals a positive impact on casino firm performance in the OLS results (t =
1.994,/? = 0.049) at the 0.05 significance level; however, no significant impact was found
in the 2SLS results. As aforementioned that the 2SLS technique in Eq. (1) is justified by
the DWH test, and it yields unbiased and consistent parameter estimates better than OLS
102

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

(Wooldridge, 2003); FIX was determined not to have a significant impact on casino firm
performance. In other words, a possible accounting distortion (e.g., different depreciation
methods) o f casino firm performance as measured by proxy Q was not evidenced
statistically in the sample firms. Only 39.6% o f the 106 casino firm/year observations had
more than 10% o f capital expenditures as a fraction o f sales. The average FIX is 13.6%
(excluding the Wynn Resort) for the sample firms (see Table 6), compared to 49.6% in
Demsetz & Villalonga’s (2001) study where FIX showed a significantly positive impact
on average Tobin’s Q. The relatively low capital spending o f casino firms, compared to
the manufacturing firms in Demsetz & Villalonga’s (2001) study, was likely the cause o f
FIX’S non-significant relationship with casino firm performance.
The adjusted R-squared for Eq. (1) is 0.144 for OLS and 0.045 for 2SLS. That is, the
OLS model explained 14.4% o f the variations in proxy Q data where institutional
ownership was treated as an exogenous variable, and the 2SLS model accounted for only
4.5% o f the variations in proxy Q data where institutional ownership was treated
endogenously. The adjusted R-squared derived from this sector are lower than those o f
previous studies (e.g., Agrawal & Knoeber, 1996; Clay, 2001). It is possible that some
important and/or relevant explanatory variables are omitted from the model. Nevertheless,
the F statistics for Eq. (1) are 5.566 {p = 0.000) for OLS and 2.227 {p - 0.071) for 2SLS,
indicating that both models are statistically significant, but at the different significance
levels, in explaining the variations in casino firm performance as measured by proxy Q.
Serious multicollinearity does not seem to be present in the OLS model, since all
VIFs are below 10 (Neter et ah, 1996). According to the rule o f thumb provided by
Kennedy (2003) and Wooldridge (Jeffrey M. Wooldridge, personal communication, April
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5, 2005) and in view o f the t statistics o f the 2SLS results in Table 19, any possible effect
from multicollinearity among the independent variables in 2SLS seems to be minimal.
While the DWH test suggests adoption o f the 2SLS technique in Eq. (1) in the casino
sector, the OLS and 2SLS techniques provide different results on the t tests for the set of
independent variables.
Institutional Ownership Equation: The Casino Sector
As seen in Table 20, proxy Q was found to be a non-significant determinant o f the
percentage o f institutional ownership in casino firms for both the OLS and 2SLS results.
Contrary to what was expected, firm performance, as measured by proxy Q in this study,
is not considered a significant factor while institutional investors make their buy/sell
decisions on casino stocks. One possible explanation for this result is that casino firm
performance is substantially affected by fluctuations o f gambling outcomes in the easinos
from time to time, which prevents institutional investors from using this variable in
making their buy/sell decisions. The factor o f “chance” or “luck” inherent in casino
gaming is something that financial institutions may not be able to price accordingly.
Another possible explanation is that firm performance measures, other than proxy Q, may
be more suitable for the casino sector and may project a better picture o f casino firm
performance. Mergers and aequisitions (M&A) activities o f casino firms have been
frequently observed in recent years and firm performance measures, such as operating
margin, net profit margin, return on capital or return on net worth, are widely used in
M&A activities (Bojanie & Officer, 1994; Malatesta & Walkling, 1988). It is possible
that institutional investors have adopted these measures in gauging casino firm
performance when making their buy/sell decisions.
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Table 20
Regression Results o f the Institutional Ownership Equation for the Casino Sector
Dependent Variable: Institutional Ownership Percentage
2SLS

OLS
t statistics

VIF

p value

t statistics

p value

-3.973

0.000

-4.555

0.000

Ô

1.024

0208

1.536

-0.336

0238

SIZE

5.759

0.000

1.684

5.570

0.000

ROA

0.917

0.361

1.501

1.052

0.295

BETA

1.390

0.168

1.639

1.402

0.164

DEBT

<Z186

0.031

1.598

-0.589

0.557

0.600

0.550

1.152

0.707

0.481

13.125

0.000

12.396

0.000

(Intercept)

DIV

F statistics

Adjusted

0.394

0.409

SIZE has a significant and positive impact on institutional ownership in casino firms
for both the OLS (t = 5.759,p = 0.000) and 2SLS (t = 5.570,p = 0.000) results at the 0.01
significance level. Thus, larger casino firms attract more equity capital from institutional
investors. This finding is consistent with what was expected, in that financial institutions
are more likely to buy stocks o f large firms (Crutchley et ah, 1999).
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Inconsistent with the research o f O ’Brien and Bhushan’s (1990), and Crutchley et
al.’s (1999), ROA was not found to be a significant determinant o f institutional
ownership pereentage for either the OLS or 2SLS results. Similar to the rationale for the
non-significance o f proxy Q and contrary to what was expected, ROA was not a
significant factor for institutional investors in making their investment decisions in this
study.
Inconsistent with what O ’Brien and Bhushan (1990), and Crutchley et al. (1999)
found, BETA, or the systematic risk o f the casino firms in this study, does not
demonstrate a significant impact on the ehanges in institutional ownership percentage for
either the OLS or 2SLS results. One possible explanation for the lack o f significance of
the BETA variable in the model is that the stocks o f casino firms are not considered as
risky, as evidenced by the average BETA o f 0.599 (see Table 6) for the sample firms,
where only 22 out o f the 106 casino firm/year observations had a BETA greater than one.
Typical stocks have a BETA equal to or greater than one (Keown et al., 2003). In other
words, the overall low BETA in the casino sector shows that financial institutions do not
consider risk in terms of BETA measurement a significant factor when making their
buy/sell decisions on casino stocks.
DEBT has a significant and negative impact on institutional ownership in casino
firms in the OLS (t = -2.186,/? = 0.031) results at the 0.05 significance level, but not in
the 2SLS results. Since OLS is sufficient in estimating Eq. (2), DEBT is determined to be
a significant determinant o f institutional ownership in casino firms in this study. Thus,
higher debt ratios lead to lower institutional ownership percentages. This finding is
consistent with the notion that higher debt ratios diminish the need for institutional
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monitoring and result in lower shareholdings by institutions (Demsetz & Villalonga, 2001;
Welch, 2003). This result also indieates that debt and institutional ownership may have
beeome substitutes for eaeh other in the agency framework. In other words, low leverage
in casino firms may give more room for institutions to play their monitoring role, thus
creating an ineentive for them to hold more shares.
DIV does not play a significant role in affecting institutional ownership percentage in
casino firms for either the OLS or 2SLS results at the 0.1 signifieanee level.
The adjusted R-squared o f Eq. (2) is 0.409 for OLS and 0.394 for 2SLS. Alternatively,
40.9% o f the variations o f institutional ownership were explained by the OLS model and
39.4% o f variations o f institutional ownership were accounted for by the 2SLS model.
The adjusted R-squared figures for Eq. (2) in this study are fairly eomparable to those o f
previous studies (Agrawal & Knoeber, 1996; Clay, 2001). In this study, the model F
statistics for Eq. (2) are 13.125 {p = 0.000) for OLS and 12.396 {p = 0.000) for 2SLS,
which confirm that the models are statistically significant at the 0.01 significance level in
explaining the variations in institutional ownership in casino firms.
While OLS is sufficient in Eq. (2) in the casino sector, VIFs are all below 10, and,
therefore, no serious multicollinearity appears to be present (Neter et al., 1996). Both
OLS and 2SLS provide identieal results on the t tests for the set o f independent variables
except on the DEBT variables.
Firm Performance Equation: The Hotel Sector
Table 21 shows both the OLS and 2SLS results o f Eq. (I) for the hotel sector.
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Table 21 Regression Results o f the Performance Equation for the Hotel Sector
Dependent Variable: Firm Performance (Proxy Q)
2SLS

OLS
t statistics

p value

(Intercept)

0.007

0295

INST

0.955

0.343

SIZE

1.531

DEBT
FIX

VIF

t statistics

p value

(F288

0.774

I.3I5

1.466

0.147

0.130

1.153

0.515

0 /# 8

-1.802

0.076

1.164

-0.684

0.496

-1.588

0.117

1.082

-0.548

0286

F statistics

3.875

0.007

3.712

0.009

Adjusted

0.136

0.131

Institutional ownership, whether treated exogenously or endogenously, does not
significantly affect hotel firm performance, as measured by proxy Q at the O.I
significance level in this study. From a theoretical and empirical standpoint, the finding is
consistent with Demsetz’s (1983) argument on ownership endogeneity. It also supports
other empirical research (Agrawal & Knoeber, 1996; Craswell et al., 1997; Loderer &
Martin, 1997) that ownership structure o f a firm is an endogenous outcome o f
competitive selection within the firm leading to firm value maximization. Therefore, no
systematic relationship between firm performance and ownership structure should be
expected. Thus, a higher percentage o f institutional ownership is not associated with
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better or worse hotel firm performance in this study. From a statistical standpoint, the
endogeneity o f the institutional ownership variable is not evidenced by the DWFI test;
this result eonflicts with Demsetz’s (1983) argument on ownership endogeneity. One
possible reason for this apparent contradiction may be due to the small hotel sample size
( N = 75) in this study.

The non-significant relationship between institutional ownership and firm
performance in the hotel sector also raises concerns from a statistical perspective. While
the pair-wise Pearson correlation coefficient between the two (0.253) at the 0.05
significance level (see Table 10) suggests some relationship between in a regression
model, both part and partial correlation coefficients between INST and proxy Q reduced
to below 0.1 with other control variables ineluded in the model; henee the
non-significance o f INST on proxy Q (Hair, Anderson, Tatham & Black, 1998).
SIZE, a control variable, was found to be a non-insignificant determinant o f hotel
firm performance for both the OLS and 2SLS results at the O.I significance level,
possibly also due to the small sample size ( N = 75) in this study.
DEBT was found to be a significant and negative determinant o f hotel firm
performance in the OLS (t = -1 .802,p = 0.076) results at the O.I significance level, but
not in the 2SLS results. Sinee OLS is sufficient in Eq. (I) for the hotel sector, the OLS
results were adopted. Although the hotel industry, characterized by a 41.9% mean debt
ratio in the sample (see Table 7), relies less on debt than equity capital, DEBT has a
value-reducing effect on proxy Q. This finding has some possible explanations. Firstly, as
the pecking order theory suggests, well-performing firms in terms o f their profitability
are likely to be less-leveraged because they tend to finance their projects with internally
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generated earnings first (Morck et al., 1988; Myers & Majluf, 1984; Tong & Ning, 2004;
Welch, 2003), the hotel industry usually cannot afford new development without some
form o f public financing support, and the debt burden causes performance measure
reductions (Hazinski, 2005). Secondly, the market seems to discourage hotel firms from
utilizing more debt for future development possibly due to an unfavorable performance
outlook on the hotel sector, especially given a recession and the effect o f the 9.11 attacks
(Higley, 2004).
FIX does not demonstrate any significant impact on firm performance for either the
OLS or 2SLS results at the O.I significance level. A possible accounting distortion (e.g.,
different depreciation methods) o f hotel firm performance, measured by proxy Q, was not
evidenced statistically in the sample firms in this study. Only 44% o f the 75 hotel
firm/year observations had more than 10% o f capital expenditures as a fraction o f sales.
The average FIX is 18.50% for the sample firms (see Table 7), compared to 49.6% in
Demsetz & Villalonga’s (2001) research where showed a significant and positive impact
on average Tobin’s Q. The relatively low capital spending o f the hotel sector, compared
to the manufacturing firms in Demsetz & Villalonga’s (2001) study, was likely the cause
o f f i x ’s non-significant impact on hotel firm performance.
The adjusted R-squared for Eq. (I) is 0.136 for OLS and 0.131 for 2SLS. In other
words, the OLS model explained 13.6% o f the variations o f proxy Q where institutional
ownership was treated as an exogenous variable, and the 2SLS model accounted for
13.1% o f the variations o f proxy Q where institutional ownership was treated
endogenously. The adjusted R-squared o f the models in this sector are less comparable
than those o f previous studies (Agrawal & Knoeber, 1996; Clay, 2001); possibly some
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relevant explanatory variables are missing from the model. The F statistics for Eq. (1) are
3.875 ip = 0.007) for OLS and 3.712 {p = 0.009) for 2SLS, indicating that both models
are statistically significant, at the 0.01 significance level, in explaining the variations in
hotel firm performance as measured by proxy Q.
While the DWH test suggests OLS application in Eq. (1) in the hotel sector, all VIFs
are below 10, indicating possible absence o f serious multicollinearity. The OLS and
2SLS techniques yield similar results on the t tests o f the set o f independent variables
except for the DEBT variable.
Institutional Ownership Equation: The Hotel Sector
Table 22 presents regression results o f the institutional ownership equation for the
hotel sector.
In particular, proxy Q was not found to be a significant determinant o f the percentage
o f institutional ownership in hotel firms for both the OLS and 2SLS results at the O.I
significance level. One possible explanation for the lack o f significance o f proxy Q might
be that other variables omitted from the equation may be more important for institutional
investors when making their buy/sell decisions than the hotel firm performance measure
(proxy Q) used in this study. A second possibility may be the small sample size (V = 75).
A third possibility may be that serious multicollinearity produced enlarged variances o f
the coefficient estimates, making it harder to reject the null hypothesis in a t-test for
proxy Q in 2SLS (Kennedy, 2003). For the following interpretation on the non-significant
variables, the multicollinearity issue should be noted.
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Table 22
Regression Results o f the Institutional Ownership Equation for the Hotel Sector
Dependent Variable: Institutional Ownership Percentage
OLS
t statistics

2SLS

/? value

VIF

t statistics

/? value

-1.095

0278

-1.125

0265

Ô

0.848

0.400

1.284

1.412

0.163

SIZE

2.088

0.041

1.688

0.884

0280

ROA

0.907

0268

1.111

-0.539

0.592

BETA

0.671

0.504

1.751

-0.664

0.509

DEBT

-2.241

0T28

1.199

4)289

0.699

DIV

-2.861

0.006

1.170

-1.724

0.090

F statistics

5.243

0.000

2.522

0.030

Adjusted

0.261

(Intercept)

0.113

SIZE has a significant and positive impaet on institutional ownership in hotel firms
for the OLS (t = 2.088,/? = 0.041) results at the 0.05 significance level, but not for the
2SLS results. Since 2SLS is deemed appropriate by the DWH test, SIZE is not
determined to be signifieant in this study.
Inconsistent with the research o f O ’Brien and Bhushan’s (1990), and Crutchley et
al.’s (1999), ROA was not found to be a significant determinant o f institutional
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ownership percentage in hotel firms for either the OLS or 2SLS results at the 0.1
significance level. However, this significance test was conducted with a risk of
committing a Type II error. Particularly, the opposite signs o f ROA in the OLS and 2SLS
results may be the result o f the small sample size ( N = 75) and the existence o f serious
multicollinearity. Further, the insignificance o f ROA in 2SLS may also result from
serious multieollinearity that causes smaller t statistics. Similarly, BETA, or the
systematic risk o f the hotel firms in this study, does not have a significant relationship
with the changes in institutional ownership percentage for both the OLS and 2SLS results
at the 0.1 significance level. This finding also has a possibility o f committing a Type II
error. The opposite signs on the BETA variable in the OLS and 2SLS results could also
be caused by the small sample size and serious multicollinearity, and the non-significance
o f BETA in 2SLS may be caused by the enlarged variance resulting from serious
multicollinearity. Therefore, no definite conclusions should be made on these two
variables.
DEBT exhibits a significant and negative impact on institutional ownership in hotel
firms in the OLS (t = - 2 . 2 4 1 , = 0.028) results at the 0.05 significance level, but not in
the 2SLS results. Since 2SLS is appropriate in estimating Eq. (2), DEBT is determined
“possibly” a non-significant determinant o f institutional ownership in hotel firms with a
risk o f committing a Type II error.
DIV does play a significant role in institutional ownership percentage in hotel firms
for both the OLS (t = -2.861, p = 0.006) and 2SLS (t = -1.724,/> = 0.090) results, but at
different significance levels. The negative sign suggests that institutions prefer hotel
firms that retain earnings for future reinvestment purposes, rather than pay out dividends.
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Since hotels usually cannot afford future projects only with internally-generated funds
and they raise funds through debt financing (Hazinski, 2005), it makes sense that
institutional investors would prefer hotel firms retain earnings for reinvestment to lower
the proportion o f debt financing for future projects.
The adjusted R-squared for Eq. (2) are 0.261 for OLS and 0.113 for 2SLS. That is,
26.1% o f the variations o f institutional ownership were explained by the OLS model and
only 11.3% o f the variations o f institutional ownership were accounted for by the 2SLS
model. The adjusted R-squared for Eq. (2) in this study are less comparable to those of
previous studies (Agrawal & Knoeber, 1996; Clay, 2001), and some important variables
may be missing from the model. In this study, the model F values for Eq. (2) are 5.243 (p
= 0.000) for OLS and 2.522 {p = 0.030) for 2SLS, signifying that both models are
statistically significant, at the 0.05 significance level, in explaining the variations in
institutional ownership in hotel firms.
While 2SLS is preferred in Eq. (2) in the hotel sector, the 2SLS results in Table 22
raise some concern about committing Type II errors because o f possible serious
multicollinearity among independent variables. The OLS and 2SLS techniques show
relatively different results on the t tests o f the set o f independent variables and on the
signs o f the coefficients.

Hypotheses Testing
In review o f the preceding sections presenting the results o f statistical analysis on the
relationship between institutional ownership and firm performanee in three sectors o f the
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hospitality industry, the three hypotheses constructed for this dissertation are tested in
this section.
Hypothesis I posits that institutional ownership will have a positive impact on firm
performance in the restaurant sector. This hypothesis is supported at least at the 0.01
significance level. Employing the 2SLS technique, restaurant firm performance as
measured by proxy Q is dependent on the percentage o f institutional ownership (t = 6.134,
p = 0.000) where institutional ownership is treated as an endogenous explanatory variable

as suggested by the DW H test. Alternatively, treating institutional ownership as a pure
exogenous explanatory variable, the OLS results still support Hypothesis I— that
institutional ownership significantly influences restaurant firm performance in a positive
way (t = 9.246,/? = 0.000).
Hypothesis II posits that institutional ownership will have a positive impact on firm
performance in the casino sector. This hypothesis is supported at the 0.05 level. Treating
institutional ownership as an endogenous explanatory variable and employing the 2SLS
technique as suggested by the DWH test, casino firm performance as measured by proxy
Q is dependent on the percentage o f institutional ownership (t = 2.185,/? = 0.031) at the

0.05 significance level. Alternatively treating institutional ownership as a pure exogenous
explanatory variable, the OLS results support Hypothesis II— that institutional ownership
significantly influences casino firm performance in a positive manner (t = 1.970,/? =
0.051) at the 0.1 significance level.
Hypothesis III posits that institutional ownership will have a positive impact on firm
performance in the hotel sector. This hypothesis is not supported as the other two sectors
were. Treating institutional ownership either endogenously or exogenously, hotel firm
115

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

performance as measured by proxy Q is not dependent on the percentage o f institutional
ownership at the 0.1 significance level.

Assumptions Checking
The underlying assumptions including normality, linearity and homoscedasticity o f
residuals for both the OLS and 2SLS techniques were examined by residuals scatterplots
in which one axis is predicted scores o f proxy Q and the other axis is errors o f prediction
(Tabachnick & Fidell, 2001). Only relevant residuals scatterplots produced by the suitable
techniques (OLS or 2SLS) in Eqs. (1) and (2) for the three sectors are presented in
Figures 20-25 that follow. After comparing residuals scatterplots in Figures 20-25 in this
study with examples o f serious violations provided by Tabachnick & Fidell (2001),
except for Figure 22, it appears that no major violations on the assumptions o f the OLS
and 2SLS regression are present in this study. The pattern of residuals in Figure 22
suggests that there might be some missing variables omitted from the casino firm
performance model, and this is supported by the low adjusted R-squared o f 0.045 o f the
model.
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Figure 20. Residuals Scatterplot for Restaurant Firm Performance (2SLS)
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Figure 21. Residuals Scatterplot for Restaurant Institutional Ownership (OLS)
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Figure 22. Residuals Scatterplot for Casino Firm Performance (2SLS)
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Figure 23. Residuals Scatterplot for Casino Institutional Ownership (OLS)
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Figure 24. Residuals Scatterplot for Hotel Firm Performance (OLS)
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Figure 25. Residuals Scatterplot for Hotel Institutional Ownership (2SLS)
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As mentioned in Chapter Three, the order condition for identification for equations in
a simultaneous equations system can be checked when constructing the model, and the
rank condition for identification can only be checked after data analysis. The rank
condition for identification states that the first equation in a two-equation simultaneous
system is identified if, and only if, the second equation includes at least one exogenous
variable excluded from the first equation and the coefficient o f the excluded exogenous
variable has a non-zero coefficient (Wooldridge, 2003). That is, the rank condition for
identification is met for Eq. (1) if at least one o f the coefficients for ROA, BETA and DIV
in Eq. (2) is non-zero. Similarly, the rank condition for identification is met for Eq. (2) if
the coefficient for FIX in Eq. (1) is not zero. Examining the regression results section in
this chapter confirms that the rank condition for identification for equations in this
dissertation is met since none o f the excluded exogenous variables in any equation has a
zero coefficient.

Summary
Statistical analysis and findings on the relationship between institutional ownership
and firm performance for the three sectors o f the hospitality industry were presented in
this chapter. The descriptive statistics o f the variables involved in this study were
presented; the DWH tests were performed on INST and proxy Q to justify the need and
adoption o f the 2SLS technique in either the firm performance equation or the
institutional ownership equation; both OLS and 2SLS regression analyses were employed
after the DWH test, in an attempt to identify whether any significant relationship existed
between institutional ownership and firm performance; relevant data analysis results were
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discussed; and lastly, the underlying assumptions o f regression analysis were checked.
Next, summary, conclusions and recommendations for future research will be presented
in Chapter Five.
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CHAPTER 5

SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS AND
RECOMMENDATIONS
Introduction
Since Berle & Means (1932) first noted the problems caused by the separation o f
ownership and control in corporations, the impact o f ownership structure on firm
performance has been a subject o f debate. The rising importance o f institutional investors
in corporate governance has been observed in the growth o f institutional ownership in the
U.S. corporate equity market during the last several decades. The ownership
structure/firm performance relationship is further complicated in the agency framework
when institutional investors represent a number o f individual investors as a whole and act
as major shareholders in the firm. The financial theory has hypothesized that institutional
ownership can increase managerial monitoring from a corporate governance perspective,
mitigate agency problems and thus help improve firm performance (Black, 1992;
Chaganti & Damanpour, 1991; Pound, 1991). Empirically, many researchers have
examined the relationship between institutional ownership and firm performance in the
major industries including the manufacturing sectors, but the conclusions have been
mixed (Agrawal & Knoeber, 1996; Chaganti & Damanpour, 1991; Clay, 2001; Craswell
et al., 1997; Han & Suk, 1998; Loderer & Martin, 1997; McConnell & Servaes, 1990;
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Woidtke, 2002). To my best knowledge, to date, no research has been conducted on how
financial institutions may influence firm performance through their stockholdings in the
hospitality industry. Therefore, the main goals o f this dissertation were to examine the
impact o f institutional ownership on firm performance in the hospitality industry,
particularly in the restaurant, casino and hotel sectors; compare the results with those o f
previous studies; and provide interpretation and implications o f the findings. The
empirical findings from this study should contribute to the body o f knowledge in
hospitality finance from the perspective o f a major service industry.
This chapter first summarizes the findings o f this dissertation. Implications o f the
findings are then discussed. Next, limitations o f the study are addressed, and, finally, the
last section o f this chapter presents a list o f recommendations for future research.

Summary o f the Study
This study was designed to investigate the relationship between institutional
ownership and firm performance in the hospitality industry, particularly in the restaurant,
casino and hotel sectors. In consideration o f the research questions and after a review o f
related literature, a simultaneous equations system including a firm performance equation
and another institutional ownership equation was proposed. In addition, three hypotheses
were constructed that posit a significant and positive impact o f institutional ownership on
firm performance in the three sectors.
In the firm performance equation [i.e., Eq. (1)], proxy Q was selected as the firm
performance measure and as the dependent variable, while the independent variables
were INST, SIZE, DEBT, and FIX. In the institutional ownership equation [i.e., Eq. (2)],
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the percentage o f institutional ownership o f a firm’s outstanding shares was the
dependent variable, while the independent variables were proxy g , SIZE, ROA, BETA,
DEBT, and DIV. Most o f the independent variables in Eqs. (1) and (2), including SIZE,
DEBT, FIX, ROA, BETA, DEBT and DIV are all firm-specific variables and act as
control variables for the possibility o f their causing spurious relationship between
institutional ownership and firm performance. The selection and inclusion o f the control
variables were justified by current financial theory and from previous studies.
Ownership endogeneity was a major concern and consideration in this study.
Ownership endogeneity states that the ownership structure o f a firm, whether
concentrated or diffused, is an endogenous outcome o f competitive selection within the
firm leading to firm value maximization (Demsetz, 1983). The results o f the study
provide evidence on the endogeneity o f institutional ownership in the restaurant and
casino sectors based on the DWH test and support previous studies arguing ownership
structure endogeneity in other industries (Cho, 1998; Clay, 2001; Demsetz, 1983;
Demsetz & Lehn, 1985; Demsetz & Villalonga, 2001; Holdemess et al., 1999; Loderer &
Martin, 1997). While those studies arguing for ownership endogeneity simply apply the
2SLS technique without statistical justifications and then compare the results with those
obtained from the OLS technique, the DWH test in this study acts not only to test the
“suspicious” endogeneity o f institutional ownership, but also to justify the need for the
2SLS technique in a simultaneous equations framework. From a statistical standpoint,
acting as an endogenous explanatory variable in Eq. (1). in the restaurant and casino
sectors, the institutional ownership variable (i.e., INST) was found related to the error
term o f the firm performance variable (i.e., proxy Q); from a practical standpoint, the
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level o f institutional ownership in restaurant and casino firms was found endogenously
determined by firm-specific factors such as firm size and debt ratio. All six control
variables in this study also act as instrumental variables in equations where the 2SLS
technique is appropriate.
To accomplish the main goal o f this study, three major sectors o f the hospitality
industry, namely restaurant, casino and hotel, were identified and selected for analysis
based on their individual NAICS code numbers. Given the availability o f accounting and
financial data o f the hospitality firms o f interest, the period o f 1999-2003 was chosen as
the study time frame and each firm/year observation was treated as an unique case in the
pooled sample for the three sectors respectively. The final sample consisted o f 284
restaurant firm/year observations, 106 casino firm/year observations, and 75 hotel
firm/year observations. From an individual firm perspective, the sample included 65
restaurant firms, 24 casino firms, and 19 hotel firms.
The empirical findings o f this study show that, firstly, in the restaurant sector, the
percentage o f institutional ownership significantly influences firm performance and vice
versa. Secondly, in the casino sector, the percentage o f institutional ownership was also
found to be a significant determinant o f firm performance, but the reverse is not true.
Lastly, in the hotel sector, no significant relationship between institutional ownership and
firm performance is present. A summary o f findings for the three sectors are presented in
Table 23, 24, and 25 respectively.
In testing the three hypotheses. Hypothesis I positing a significant and positive impact
o f institutional ownership on restaurant firm performance was supported. Hypothesis II
positing a significant and positive impact o f institutional ownership on casino firm
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performance was also supported. But, Hypothesis III posting a significant and positive
impact o f institutional ownership on hotel firm performance was not supported in this
study.

Table 23 Summary o f Findings for the Restaurant Sector
Firm Performance Equation

Institutional Ownership Equation

E cp (l)

EqX2)

0

INST

Dependent
Variable
Explanatory
Predicted

Actual

Significant?

Predicted

Actual

Significant?

+

+

Yes

Variable

Q

INST

+

+

Yes

SIZE

-

-

Yes

+

+

Yes

DEBT

+ /-

+

Yes

-

-

Yes

FIX

+ /-

+

Yes

ROA

+

+

Yes

BETA

+/—

—

No

DIV

+ /-

-

Yes

Hypothesis I

Supported

NA
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Table 24 Summary o f Findings for the Casino Sector
Firm Performance Equation

Institutional Ownership Equation

E q .( l )

E q.(2)

0

INST

Dependent
Variable
Explanatory
Predicted

Actual

Significant?

Predicted

Actual

Significant?

+

+

No

Variable

Q
INST

+

+

Yes

SIZE

-

-

Yes

+

4-

Yes

-

-

Yes

ROA

+

+

No

BETA

+ /-

+

No

DIV

+/~

+

No

DEBT

+/—

+

Yes

FIX

+ /-

+

No

Hypothesis II

Supported

NA
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Table 25 Summary o f Findings for the Hotel Sector
Firm Performance Equation

Institutional Ownership Equation

Eq. (1)

Eq.(2)

0

INST

Dependent
Variable
Explanatory
Predicted

Actual

Significant?

Predicted

Actual

Significant?

+

+

No

Variable

0
INST

+

+

No

SIZE

—

+

No

+

+

No

DEBT

+ /-

-

Yes

-

-

No

FIX

+ /-

-

No

ROA

+

-

No

BETA

+ /-

-

No

DIV

+ /-

-

Yes

Hypothesis III

NA

Not Supported
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Implications o f Hypothesis I Findings
This dissertation has found institutional ownership to be a significant and positive
determinant o f firm performance as measured by proxy Q in the restaurant sector during
1999-2003. Acting as a cohort and representing individual investors, financial institutions
seem to successfully play the role o f major shareholders in restaurant firms. They may
have exercised their right as shareholders and exerted their voting and monitoring power
in restaurant firms in order to fulfill their fiduciary duties to their investors, thus helping
enhance firm performance instead o f just following the traditional “exit policy” when
dissatisfied with firm management and incurring substantial losses as a result.
Traditionally, institutions simply follow the “Wall Street Rule” or an “exit policy” when
dissatisfied with firm management, and hence barely have any impact on firm
performance (Bathala et al., 1994; Graves & Waddock, 1990).
In the restaurant sample in this study, the average institutional ownership percentage
increased steadily from 38.7% in 1999 to 42.7% in 2003. This seems to indicate
institutional investors’ increasing interest in investing in the restaurant sector. W ith the
rising importance o f institutional ownership in publicly traded restaurant firms,
institutions may have assumed an efficient monitoring role in influencing firm
decision-making in a positive manner and achieved a better firm performance as
evidenced by the results o f this study. In the meantime, the low-debt restaurant sector
may have offered an attractive corporate governance environment for financial
institutions to exercise their equity-purchasing power and management monitoring, and
helped improve restaurant firm performance by involving them in corporate
decision-making process. Higher DEBT, as with higher institutional ownership, resulting
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in better restaurant firm performance as measured by proxy Q in a significant way in this
study indicates some level o f efficient monitoring provided by creditors. In addition, the
negative sign o f DEBT in the institutional ownership equation provides further evidence
that institutional ownership and debt leverage may have become substitutes in mitigating
the agency problems/costs in the agency framework in the restaurant sector as evidenced
in previous studies (Bathala et al., 1994; Crutchley et al., 1999). In other words,
institutional ownership in restaurant firms not only can substitute creditors in the
monitoring functions in the agency framework, but also can act as a firm performance
enhancer.
As mentioned in Chapter One, stock performance is o f critical importance to
investors’ vested interest in restaurant firms, and therefore affects their desire to invest in
the restaurant sector. As a result, investing in the restaurant sector institutionally may be a
better form o f investing than individually for restaurant investors to diminish the agency
problem caused by the separation o f management from ownership. Financial institutions
have collective and, hence, greater monitoring power over firm management on behalf of
individual investors. This helps improve firm performance and enhance the value o f
restaurant firms in the equity market. In addition, individual investors may chase
institutions’ buy/sell decisions on restaurant firm stocks, in that shareholdings by
institutions indicate possible firm performance enhancement in the future.
Furthermore, financial institutions are also attracted to better-performing, larger and
more profitable restaurant firms with lower financial leverage and dividend payouts.
Most likely, institutional investment managers prefer better-performing restaurant firms
in order to fulfill their fiduciary duties to investors. Therefore, institutional ownership and
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firm performance affect each other significantly and positively in a simultaneous
framework in the restaurant sector. More institutional monitoring o f restaurant firm
management helps institutions and individual investors gauge firm operations and
corporate decisions in a more transparent way, and therefore reduce investment risk.
These findings can certainly further help restaurant firm management recognize possible
influence and monitoring derived from the presence o f institutional investors through
shareholdings. This can encourage corporate management to direct the firm towards
value maximization that is in the shareholders’ best interests. The board o f directors in
restaurant firms may also utilize their debt and dividend policies interchangeably, or
simultaneously, as an instrument to manage the level and possible influence o f
institutional ownership in the firm in mitigating the agency problem or the agency costs.

Implications o f Hypothesis II Findings
Similar to what was found in the restaurant sector, institutional ownership is deemed
a significant and positive determinant o f firm performance as measured by proxy Q in the
casino sector during 1999-2003. Despite the possible hindrance o f ownership restrictions
set forth in state gaming regulations such as those in the states o f Nevada and New Jersey,
institutional investors play an important role in the corporate governance arena o f casino
firms, as supported by their positive influence on firm performance in this study. For
example, although an institutional investor is refrained from owning more than 15% of
equity shares o f a casino firm in Nevada, if a waiver o f finding o f suitability is to be
granted, individual institutional investors together may be able to act as a cohort o f
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investors in a single casino firm and collectively exert significant influence on casino
firm performance.
In the casino sample in this study, the average institutional ownership percentage
increased steadily from 43.3% in 1999 to 50.7% in 2002, but decreased to 43.2% in 2003.
The sudden decrease in institutional ownership in 2003 may be due to unknown factors,
and it deserves a separate examination. The seemingly increasing trend o f institutional
ownership from 1999 to 2002, accompanied by an increasing mean proxy Q o f 1.09 in
1999 to 1.15 in 2002, shows that institutions may have assumed an efficient monitoring
role in influencing firm decisions in a positive way and contributed to better firm
performance as evidenced in the casino sector. As a result, investing in the casino sector
institutionally could be a better investment form than individually for casino investors to
reduce the agency problem caused by the separation o f management from ownership.
The negative sign o f DEBT in the institutional ownership equation further indicates
that institutional ownership and debt leverage may have become substitutes in mitigating
the agency problems/costs in the agency framework in the casino sector as evidenced in
the restaurant sector and in previous studies (Bathala et al., 1994; Crutchley et al., 1999).
While DEBT signifies a significant and positive impact on casino firm performance as
measured by proxy Q and suggests some level o f efficient monitoring provided by
creditors in this study, institutional ownership not only may substitute DEBT in the
agency relationship but also may help improve firm performance.
On the other hand, the findings o f this study show that financial institutions are
attracted to larger casino firms with lower financial leverage. Casino firm management,
on the other hand, should be aware o f institutional investors’ potential influence on firm
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performance and in corporate management decision-making process through their
shareholdings, and manage the firm in a way that maximizes firm value. As with the
restaurant sector, the board o f directors in casino firms may also utilize their debt policy
as a tool to direct the level and possible influence o f institutional investors in the firm in
controlling the agency problem.

Implications o f Hypothesis III Findings
Different the restaurant and casino sectors, institutional ownership in the hotel sector
does not influence firm performance as measured by proxy Q during 1999-2003.
Financial institutions, given their average institutional ownership o f 43.9% (see Table 7)
in this study, play the role o f major shareholders in hotel firms, but perhaps not in a
significant and efficient way that could have influenced firm performance in a positive
manner as hypothesized.
The average institutional ownership percentage in the hotel sample in this study
increased gradually from 40.37% in 1999 to 46.59% in 2003. This suggests institutional
investors’ rising interest in incorporating hotel firms in their portfolio. However, possibly
due to their insufficient participation in corporate governance in hotel firms, institutional
investors’ influence is not significantly demonstrated in firm performance. That is, they
may not be efficient monitors o f firm management in the agency framework and simply
act as passive investors. Another possibility o f the lack o f a significant institutional
ownership/firm performance relationship is that, institutional ownership in hotel firms is
an endogenously determined outcome o f competitive selection o f ownership structures
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leading to firm value maximization, and, therefore, no systematic relationship between
the two was observed.
The non-significant relationship between institutional ownership and debt leverage
suggests that institutional ownership may not have become a substitute for debt leverage
in mitigating the agency problems/costs in the hotel sector as evidenced in the restaurant
and casino sectors in this and previous studies (Bathala et ah, 1994; Crutchley et ah,
1999). This further suggests that institutional investors play a passive role in hotel firms.
Consequently, investing in the hotel sector institutionally may not be considered a better
form o f investing than individually for hotel investors to reduce the agency problem
caused by the separation o f management from ownership.

Limitations
Two limitations o f this study are addressed in this section. First, due to data
availability issues, each firm/year observation was treated as an unique case and all
firm/year observations were pooled as a sample for analysis in each hospitality sector.
Since not every firm has the same number o f years o f data available, for example some
may have full five years o f data and some m ay have just one, some firms may carry more
“weight” than others through their presence in the pooled sample. Taking an average o f
five years o f data from 1999-2003 for each firm would be ideal but there are not many
publicly traded hospitality firms, particularly in the casino and hotel sectors, that warrant
the regression analysis employed in this study.
The second limitation is the treatment o f fiscal year versus calendar year in this study.
While institutional ownership percentage is calculated as the year-end (i.e., December 31
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or the last trading day o f the year) percentage o f outstanding ordinary shares o f firms
owned by financial institutions, hospitality firms have different end months for their
fiscal years. While firms normally end the fiscal year in December, some, for example,
end in January, April or July. This discrepancy may raise some issue as to how to
attribute firm performance o f a fiscal year to a proper calendar year matching the
corresponding institutional ownership information o f that specific year. COMPUSTAT
attributes accounting and financial data o f firms with fiscal year ending in months prior to
June to the previous year, and ending in the month o f June or later to the existing year.
For example. Bob Evans Farms, Inc. (NASDAQ; BOBE) ends its fiscal year in April
2003, and COMPUSTAT attributes its accounting and financial data to year 2002, while
Sonic Corporation (NASDAQ: SONC) ends its fiscal year in August 2003 and
COMPUSTAT attributes the data to year 2003.

Recommendations for Future Research
The relationship between ownership structure and firm performance has emerged as a
promising research domain for hospitality researchers. In particular, the empirical
findings o f the institutional ownership/firm performance relationship from this
dissertation have advanced the domain one step further. A list o f recommendations is
presented in this section for future research to either affirm the findings o f this
dissertation or extend beyond what has been studied.
First, different types o f firm performance measures may be adopted in modeling the
institutional ownership/firm performance relationship. This study adopted a proxy for
Tobin’s Q as a firm performance measure with justifications. Future studies may employ
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other firm performance measures such as ROE, ROA or stock returns used in other
studies (Chaganti & Damanpour, 1991; Demsetz & Lehn, 1985; Han & Suck, 1998) to
affirm the empirical findings on the institutional ownership/firm performance relationship
as evidenced in this study. For the casino sector, other firm performance measures, such
as earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation and amortization (EBITDA) or cash flow,
may be adopted since these measures m ay be more relevant in gauging casino firm
performance/profitability.
Second, the impact o f voting versus non-voting shares held by financial institutions
on firm performance can be further examined. Institutional ownership percentage in this
study includes both voting and non-voting shares. A premise for the monitoring role
assumed by stockholders o f a firm is that these shares are home with the voting right that
enables stockholders to vote on matters such as corporate policies and composition o f the
board o f directors. Future study may separate institutional voting and non-voting
ownership and examine their relationships with hospitality firm performance respectively.
Therefore, the impact o f voting versus non-voting institutional ownerships on hospitality
firm performance could be more specifically and precisely identified. Furthermore, the
impact o f shareholdings by active versus non-active institutions on firm performance may
be examined. As discussed in Chapter Two, possibly due to the free rider problem in
institutional shareholder activism, only 13 institutions out of a sample o f 975 were
identified as active and having ever submitted a shareholder proposal during 1986-1994
(Daily et ah, 1996). Thus, the impact o f active versus non-active institutions on firm
performance in the hospitality industry deserves a further investigation.
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Third, other types o f shareholders such as managerial ownership and block
shareholdings may be modeled with institutional ownership simultaneously in future
studies. Since various types o f ownership are considered endogenously determined and
have been evidenced by this study and some prior studies (Cho, 1998; Clay, 2001;
Demsetz, 1983; Demsetz & Lehn, 1985; Demsetz & Villalonga, 2001; Holdemess et ah,
1999; Loderer & Martin, 1997), inclusion o f other ownership types along with
institutional ownership in the model may further reveal the impact o f institutional
ownership on firm performance while taking into consideration the inter-relationship
among managerial ownership, block-shareholder ownership and institutional ownership.
Fourth, other relevant firm-specific variables that may affect proxy g as a firm
performance measure may be included as additional control variables in the model. For
example, advertising expenditures as a fraction o f sales revenues is often considered and
included as a control variable in the firm performance equation employing Tobin’s g as a
performance measure in previous studies (Agrawal & Knoeber, 1996 Demsetz &
Villalonga, 2001; McConnell & Servaes, 1990; Morck et al., 1988; Woidtke, 2002)
because its potential influence is ignored when calculating Tobin’s Q. Advertising often
leads to brand recognition and potential sales, and hence is an indicator for future growth
opportunities (Agrawal & Knoeber, 1996; Gelb, 2002) or firm performance. Currently
generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP) requires expenditures on advertising to
be immediately expensed in financial report and this accounting practice may understate
book values for firms with significant levels o f advertising expenditures, and distort
proxy Q (Amir & Lev, 1996). Inclusion o f advertising expenditures in the model provides
a function similar to other tangible assets in contributing to firm growth (Welch, 2003).
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Advertising expenditures as a fraction o f sales was originally considered in Eq. (1) o f this
study. The hospitality industry relies on advertising to some extent for its operations and,
therefore, its potential influence on proxy Q should be considered. However, not many
firms explicitly report their advertising expenditures in the annual report. Advertising
expenditures may be reported under either sales and marketing or general marketing
expenses.
Fifth, promotion expenditures can be added as an additional control variable in the
casino firm performance model. Similar to what advertising expenditures may have
contributed to firm performance enhancement, promotions play an extremely important
role in casino operations and marketing, and hence may help generate better firm
performance not captured in the calculation o f proxy Q used in this study.
Sixth, using quarterly data, future studies may examine the impact o f changes in
institutional ownership on lagged firm performance in the hospitality industry. That is,
examining the impact o f changes in institutional ownership in the current quarter on firm
performance in the next few quarters may more precisely gauge the true impact that
institutional investors have on performance o f the firm.
Seventh, the heterogeneity o f institutional investors in future studies can be
considered. As mentioned in Chapter One, different types of institutional investors, such
as public pension funds, private pension funds, mutual funds, and insurance companies,
m ay demonstrate different investment behaviors and pursue diverse objectives subject to
various conditions and constraints. While this study treated institutional investors as a
homogenous group due to data availability, separating institutional investors by types
m ay further reveal other impacts on hospitality firm performance.
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Finally, government regulations on casino gaming and institutional ownership in
different gaming jurisdictions may be further considered in modeling the institutional
ownership/firm performance relationship in the casino sector in future studies. Although
institutional ownership shows a positive and significant impact on casino firm
performance in this study, the extent o f the role that government regulations play, if any,
in the context o f this study is unknown. The State o f Nevada imposes a 15% institutional
ownership restriction in a casino firm if a finding o f suitability is to be waived. Will
different percentages lead to different institutional behavior in their investment strategies?
Will different state regulations regarding institutional ownership on casino gaming result
in different conclusions on the institutional ownership/firm performance relationship in
the casino sector? Are government regulations regarding institutional ownership in casino
firms advantageous to institutions, firm management, or the investors? These answers
should be answered in future studies.
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